DOES A SONG BY ANY OTHER NAME
STILL SOUND AS SWEET?:
DIGITAL SAMPLING AND ITS
COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS
RANDY S. KRAviS
1
"So sampling is theft, right?"
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INTRODUCTION

Much controversy has emerged over the new technology of digital
sampling.2 Simply put, sampling is the process that recording artists
use to include previously recorded portions of another artist's work
in a new recording.' While some people in the music industry
4
believe that sampling without permission is tantamount to stealing,
others view sampling as an art form no more plagiaristic than any

2. See Don Snowden, Sampling: A CreativeTool orLicense to Steal?, L.. TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1989,
(Calendar), at 61 (describing heated debate created by growing popularity of rap music and
attendant increase in sampling).
3. See infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text (describing science and development of
digital sampling technology).
4. See Snowden, supra note 2, at 61 (articulating belief of one musician that there is
"trouble" in sampling other artists' work). As one might expect, many of the artists who equate
sampling with stealing are the same artists whose songs are being sampled. In commenting on
the use of a sound from his song in a love ballad by another artist, prominent soul artistJames
Brown said angrily, "Anything they take off my record is mine. Is it all right if I take some paint
off your house and put it on mine? Can I take a button off your shirt and put it on mine? Can
I take a toenail off your foot-is that all right with you?" For example, David Korteling, guitarist
for the local Atlanta band Second Nature, strongly disapproves of sampling and believes other
local musicians feel the same way. Interview with David Korteling, in Atlanta, Ga. (Nov. 11,
1992). See also Molly McGraw, Sound SamplingProtectionand Infringementin Today's Music Industry,
4 HIGH TECH. Lj. 147, 152 (1989). Many lesser known regional artists are also critical of
sampling. One sound engineer, whosejob it is to actually do the sampling, has expressed moral
disdain for the practice. See McGraw, supra, at 152 (quoting sound engineer Tom Lord-Alge as
saying, "'We're all blatantly stealing from everyone else'"). Even musicians who favor sampling
have noted that excessive use can be theft. SeeJeffrey Ressner, SamplingAmok?, ROLLING STONE,
June 14, 1990, at 103, 105 (quoting funk artist George Clinton as saying that DJs who sample
extended portions of music are simply "bootlegging").
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other.5 The popularity of "rap" music,6 which relies heavily on the
use of sampling,7 has pushed the technique into the spotlight of the
music industry.' As a result, a debate has arisen over the practice of
sampling and its legal implications.9

5. See Ressner, supranote 4, at 103 (discussing arguments by sampling advocates that all
new music is influenced by previous music in some way and that very few musical pieces are
completely original). Ken Anderson, a lawyer for rap artist Tommy Boy, rationalizes sampling
as follows: "All new music comes from old music in one way or another. It should be the
American way to err on the side of artistic freedom." Id. Justice Story's famous opinion in
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436), may bear out this notion:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things,
which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. ... [E]ven
Shakespeare and Milton, so justly and proudly our boast as the brightest originals
would be found to have gathered much from the abundant stores of current
knowledge and classical studies in their days.
Id. at 619. Justice Story's perspective supports the argument that, because all new music
inherently borrows from previous music, sampling in rap music is no more larcenous than other
forms of music.
6.

Melinda Henneberger & Michael Marriott, For Some, Rituals of Abuse Replace Youthful

Courtship,N.Y. TIMES,July 11, 1993, atAl (noting uniform popularity of rap among teenagers);
David Mills, Pop Recordings: Rappers to Watch, Simply Kickin'It!, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1991, at G3

(stating that rap music has become "dominant element of the American youth culture"). Rap's
popularity is clearly reflected in the amount of album sales rap and hip-hop artists generate.
SeeTeresa Moore & Tori Minton, Music of Rage S.F. CHRON., May 18, 1992, at 1 (reporting that
rap has increased from 11.6% of $5.5 billion in music sales in 1987 to 18.3% of $7.5 billion
spent in 1990). Rappers Vanilla Ice, with "To the Extreme," and M.C. Hammer (who has since
dropped the "M.C." from his name), with "Please Hammer, Don't Hurt 'Em," have each sold
over 10 million copies. Gary Graff, Rap orPop?, CHI. TRIB.,June 11, 1992, at 10D.
7.

SeeJohn Leland, The Moper vs. the Rapper,NEwSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 55 (stating that

most rap music uses samples). In fact, rap artists were sampling prior to the existence of that
term when they created what is presently known as rap music. See Snowden, supranote 2, at 62
(noting that early rappers created their own lyrics to accompany prerecorded songs or rhythm
tracks). Two albums released in 1979, "Rappers' Delight" by the Sugar Hill Gang and the selftitled album "Fatback and their DJ, Big Tim IlI," revolutionized rap music by first using
previously recorded music. See DAVID TooP, THE RAP ATrAcK: AFRICANJIVE TO NEW YORK Hip-

HoP 15-16 (1984) (discussing rap's origins);Jason H. Marcus, Note, Don't Stop That Funky Beat:
The Essentiality of Digital Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HAsTiNGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 767, 770-72

(1991) (explaining that both Sugar Hill Gang and Fatback and their DJ, Big Tim III borrowed
heavily from "Good Times" by disco group Chic); Snowden, supra note 2, at 62 (stating that
"many early hits in the [rap] genre were built around the bass line to 'Good Times' by Chic").
Since then, rappers have widely used samples in their songs. See Sheila Rule, Record Companies
Are Challenging 'Sampling' in Rap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at C13 (calling sampling "prime
element" of rap music); Snowden, supranote 2, at 62 ("Sampling has been a natural avenue for
rappers, since the style began with artists creating their own lyrics to the accompaniment of
cassette tapes of songs or skeletal rhythm tracks.").
8. See generally Lee Jeske, The Marriage of Jazz and Hip-Hop; Is This May-December Union
Producing Legit Musical Offspring?, BILLBOARD, July 3, 1993, atJ10 (calling royalty clearance for

samples "a hip-hop problem"); Leland, supra note 7, at 55 (noting that "cottage industry" has
arisen to authorize clearance to use samples); Amy Singer, DreamJob at the Top of the Charts,AM.
LAW., Apr. 1991, at 48,51 (noting thatwhen song that uses unauthorized sample is commercially
successful, company holding copyright to sampled song will take notice and seek payment).
9. See generally infra notes 130-88 (examining arguments both for and against digital
sampling). Until recently, the debate over sampling has taken place everywhere but in the
courts or in Congress, two arenas likely to provide answers to the questions over digital
sampling. See infranote 26 and accompanying text (discussing dearth ofdigital sampling cases).
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The primary area of debate focuses on the Copyright Act of
1976.10 The Act governs the making and the use of artistic creations
such as books, works of art, and musical compositions." Although
it requires artists to obtain permission before using another's sound
recordings in certain instances, 12 for the most part, the Act is illequipped to deal effectively with digital sampling. Congress simply
could not have foreseen the myriad of issues that the advanced
technology of sampling would present.1 3
For example, sampling transcends the scope of the "substantial
similarity" test14 as it was originally conceived.' Substantial similarity is one of the tests that the Copyright Act uses to determine whether
use of a copyrighted song constitutes "fair use." n Congress intended
the substantial similarity test to determine whether a re-creation or

10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (listing categories that constitute protected "works of
authorship").
12. See id. (granting copyright owner exclusive rights to reproduce copyrighted work, to
prepare derivative works, and to sell recorded copies of work).
13. See Ressner, supra note 4, at 105 (addressing problem of technology outpacing law).
Ressner quotes Eric Greenspan, an entertainment lawyer who represents Daddy-O of Stetasonic,
Prince Paul, and other rappers, as saying, "'What we're trying to do is interpret old laws for new
circumstances. The problem is that technology is moving faster than lawyers and managers can
react.'" Id.; see alsoDigitalSampling Cheered,Jeered, CHI.TRiB., Oct. 23, 1986, § 6, at 10 ("'Sound
sampling is the epitome of technology trying to squeeze into copyright law where itjust doesn't
fit.'") (quoting attorney M. William Krasilovsky); Steven Dupler, DigitalSampling. Is It Tt?,
BI.LBoARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 1, 74 (quoting record producer Arif Mard as saying that law cannot
keep up with technology, especially when specific technology, like sampling, is difficult to
understand).
The Supreme Court has recognized the continuing problem of technology outgrowing the
law. Prior to 1976, the Court struggled to apply the outdated, but still extant, Copyright Act of
1909. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 564 (1973) (concluding that technology
differed so greatly from that which existed in 1909 that Copyright Act of 1909 was inapplicable);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1968) (acknowledging
that inquiry into cable television case could not be limited to ordinary meaning of 1909 Act
because Congress drafted 1909 Act long before development of television). Even after Congress
amended the Copyright Act in 1976, the Court continued to address the race between
technology and law. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430
(1984) (stating that "the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology").
Even Congress has recognized that the 1976 Act is unable to cope with the advances in
technology. See Copyright and TechnologicalChange: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on theJudiciary,98th Cong., 1st Sess.
20 (1983) (testimony of Frederick Weingarten, Program Manager, Communication &
Information Technologies Program, Office of Technology Assessment) (explaining that new law
is necessary to protect creators in light of new technology).
14. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (describing "substantial similarity" test as
presented in 1976 Copyright Act and as interpreted by courts).
15. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (reviewing Congress' legislative intent); J.C.
Thom, Comment, DigitalSampling: Od-FashionedPiracyDressed Up in Sleek New Technology, 8 LOY.
ENr. U.J.
297,326 (1988) (arguing that substantial similarity test is inapplicable to sound recordings).
16. See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text (discussing elements of fair use defense
under § 107 of Copyright Act).
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imitation of a copyrighted work uses too much of the original
work.1" Sampling, however, does not involve the imitation of sounds,
but rather the use of a portion of another artist's actual original
work." Similarly, digital sampling presents questions of both law
and policy as to what originality means under copyright law.'
Proponents of sampling argue that the manipulation of a previous
sound into a new song is an art form in itself, thereby making the new
20
song an original work of art
Another test that the Copyright Act uses to determine whether a
use is a fair use is the "effect on the market" test, which asks whether
the imitation or re-creation of a copyrighted song adversely affects the
market for the copyrighted song.2 1 Again, when it formulated the
effect on the market test, Congress did not and could not have taken
into account sampling, where actual sounds of a song are used. 2
Some commentators have questioned whether Congress would have
outlawed digital sampling under the Act if it could have foreseen the
advent of such technologies.2Y Nevertheless, because Congress could
not have considered the unique nature of sampling when it created
and last amended the Act, legal scholars must analyze digital sampling
without direct congressional guidance. 4
Surprisingly, despite the confusion, debate, and controversy
surrounding sampling and its widespread use, it was not until
December 1991 in Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records,

17. The legislative history of the 1909 Act, which first addressed the issue of substantial
similarity, indicates that Congress focused on "imitation" when formulating the test. See H.R.
REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1909) (stating that "mere imitation of a recorded
performance would not constitute a copyright infringement even where one performer
deliberately sets out to simulate another's performance as exactly as possible") (emphasis
added).
18. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (describing sampling process as one that
extracts sounds from existing recordings and places them in new recordings).
19. See infranotes 54-60 and accompanying text (describing originality requirement created
by courts as mandating "independent creation" and "more than mere trivial variation," but not
requiring "uniqueness" or "novelty").
20. See infra notes 151-66 and accompanying text (discussing whether songs that use
sampled music are original works of art and whether sampling itself is form of art).
21. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing effect on market test and
explaining that test is one of four factors courts weigh in determining fair use).
22. Digital sampling was not available to the public at the time Congress codified the
various tests in the 1976 Copyright Act. See David Sanjek, 'Don't Have to DJNo More': Sampling
and the "Autonomous" Creator,10 CARDozo ARTS & ENT.J. 607,612 (1992) (explaining that digital
sampling originated in 1983).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 180-88 (discussing speculative debate over whether
Congress would have supported digital sampling had sampling existed in 1976).
24. See Lionel Bently, Sampling and Copyrght: Is the Law on the Right Track? - I, 1989J. BUS.
L 113, 113-25 (analyzing sampling using current law); McGraw, supra note 4, at 147-69
(discussing digital sampling in framework of current law).
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Inc.2 5 that a court handed down the first decision regarding the use

of sampling. 21 In that case, Judge Kevin Duffy for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York enjoined the production
and sale of rap artist Biz Markie's album "I Need a Haircut" because
it contained sampled portions of Gilbert O'Sullivan's 1972 hit "Alone
Again (Naturally)."27 In addition to issuing the injunction, Judge
Duffy referred the case to28 the U.S. Attorney for consideration of
possible criminal penalties.
The Grand Upright Music decision is significant for two reasons.
First, the Southern District of New York, which issued the opinion,
handles a large percentage of this country's copyright cases; thus the
court has a substantial impact on copyright law.29 Second, the
decision is the first and, so far, the only judicial attempt to provide
guidance on applying current copyright law to digital sampling.'
This Note addresses the issues that the music industry and the legal
community face with regard to digital sampling. Part I provides
background on digital sampling by examining sampling from a
technical standpoint. Part I also explains how and why sampled music
has become so popular. Part II focuses on the 1976 Copyright Act
and discusses its effect on samplers and samplees. Part III examines
the controversy and debate leading up to the Grand Upright Music
decision. In particular, this Part provides a detailed review of the
difficulties that have arisen as a result of the music industry's attempt
to apply both law and policy to digital sampling. Part IV outlines the
facts of Grand Upright Music and traces the judge's reasoning in the

25. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
26. The few sampling cases filed prior to Grand Upright Music were either settled out of
court or dismissed. See Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Casefor FairPay, 105 HARv. L.
REV. 726, 727-28 (1992) (explaining that parties often opted for settlement because litigation
costs were so high). One reason for the lack of litigation is that the music industry established
an ad hoc licensing system whereby artists bargained with other artists for the right to use
samples. Id. The system was much less costly and time consuming than litigation; consequently,
artists did not need litigation to resolve sampling disputes. Id.
27. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing "callous disregard" for copyright law as reason for injunction).
28. Id. (finding that defendant's knowledge of law requiring artists to obtain release before
using song and subsequent disregard of this requirement may be grounds for possible criminal
prosecution).
29. See infra note 211 and accompanying text (arguing that Grand Upright Music will have
large legal impact by virtue of fact that Southern District of New York is leading district for
copyright cases).
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing lack of digital sampling cases).
Congress probably intended for the courts to define the law regarding unforeseen technological
advances such as sampling. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 5659, 5680 (indicating that Congress intentionally kept doctrine of fair use
vague and open so that courts would "be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on
a case-by-case basis").
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decision, while Part V discusses the impact of the case on the music
industry. Here, the Note argues that the decision fails to address
most of the copyright issues presented by digital sampling, but
concludes that the Grand Upright Music decision will have (and to
some extent already has had) a significant effect on the use of
sampling and the music industry as a whole. Finally, Part VI
recommends that Congress amend the Copyright Act to clarify the law
on digital sampling, and suggests that Congress implement a
compulsory licensing provision for digital sampling to support the
goals of public access to works of art and protection of copyright
owners' rights.
I.

DIGITAL SAMPLING

Digital sampling is "the practice of using a portion of a previous
sound recording in a new recording.""1 The process can be broken
down into three steps: digital recording, computer sound analysis,
33
and playback. 2 In the digital recording stage, analog sound waves
from sound recordings are converted into digital codes5 4 that are

31. Robert G. Sugarman &Joseph P. Salvo, SamplingLitigationin the Limelight, 207 N.Y. L.
1, 1 (1992).
32. SeeJeffrey R Houle, DigitalAudioSampling CopyrightLaw and the AmericanMusic Industry:
Piracy orJusta Bad "Rap"?,37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 880-81 (1992) (listing and describing three-step
digital sound sampling process); BruceJ. McGiverin, Note, DigitalSound Sampling, Copyright and
Publiciy: ProtectingAgainst the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1723, 1724
(1987) (listing digital recording, computer analysis, and playback as three stages of digital sound
sampling); Ronald M. Wells, Comment, You Can'tAlways Get What You Want But DigitalSampling
Can Get What You Need!, 22 AKRON L REV. 691, 699-700 (1989) (discussing three-step sampling
process).
33. Sound is merely "a pressure fluctuation in the air." Max V. Mathews &John R. Pierce,
The Computer as a Musical Instrument, Sci. AM., Feb. 1987, at 126. Graphically, the pressure
fluctuations that create sound are represented as waveforms. When these pressure fluctuations
hit the ear, they are translated into nerve impulses that the brain interprets as sound. SeeJeffrey
S. Newton, Digital Sampling. The Copright Considerationsof a New Technological Use of Musical
Performance, 11 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. LJ. 671, 671 (1989) (describing physical properties of
sound waves). Because of the wavelike properties of sound, each sound has its own frequency
measured by the number of cycles of waves per second, also known as Hertz. McGraw, supra
note 4, at 148 n.7. The frequency determines the pitch of the sound, which, in turn, determines
the musical note. Id. For example, if one plays an A above middle C on a string instrument,
the strings would vibrate 440 times per second (i.e., 440 Hertz). Id.
34. The digital sound recording stage involves the conversion of sound waves into binary
digital units, known as bits, which are the building blocks that make up the digital code. See
Houle, supra note 32, at 881 (describing analog-to-digital conversion process). Bits are the
"smallest unit of information that a computer can recognize." CHARLES A. DODGE & THOMAS
A. JERSEY, COMPUTER Music: SYNTHESIS, COMPOSITION AND PERFORMANCE 3 (1985). Bits,
represented by a numerical value (1 or 0), are stored in the computer's memory. A digital
recording of a song, therefore, is nothing more than a series of Is and Os that relate musical
sounds to the computer in a way that the computer can understand. See McGiverin, supranote
32, at 1724 (calling digitally recorded song "a series of binary values").
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intelligible to a digital computer.35 Once in this form, the sounds
can then be altered and manipulated by rearranging the codes.M
Finally, those sounds are played back and mixed with other songs with
the touch of a keyboard. 7
While the use of the sampling process is a fairly recent phenomenon,38 digital sampling actually traces its roots back to the 1960s
when disc jockeys (DJs) began experimenting with "dub," a form of
art created when DJs mix different sounds together into a single
musical work. 39 Dub originated in Jamaica, where DJs mixed
Jamaican and non-Jamaican records together.' It continued to be
solely a Jamaican practice until a Jamaican-born DJ named Kool DJ
Herc, along with other early DJs, introduced dub in the United States

35. SeeJudith G. Finell, How a MusicologistViews DigitalSamplingIssues,207 N.Y. UJ. 5, 7 n.3
(1992) (noting that any machine with digital data processing capabilities can convert analog
sound waves into digital codes). Most often, samplers use standard personal computers or
computerized synthesizers because they generally possess the capabilities needed for sampling.
See Tamara J. Bynam, Digital Sound Sampling and a Federal Right of Publicity: Is It Live or Is It
Macintosh, 10 CoMPtrrER/Lj. 365, 366 (1990) (discussing pervasiveness of computer in music
industry); Rich Malloy & Tom Thompson, Tandy's 1000 Learns to Speak and Listen, BYrE, Sept.
1988, at 158 (presenting latest model in personal computers with built-in analog-to-digital
conversion capabilities). Samplers also use standard analog-to-digital converters to convert
sound waves into codes. See Analog Offers 16-Bit Sampling ADC 35 ELEc. NEws 32, 32 (1989)
(describing new analog-to-digital converter model).
The general physical process of digital sound recording is as follows: first, an engineer sends
the sound through a microphone to the computer. SeeHoule, supra note 32, at 881 (noting vast
difference between mechanism of digital sound sampling, which sends sound to analog-to-digital
converter, and analog recording, which sends sound signals to transducer). Next, the built-in
or attached analog-to-digital converter changes the sounds into a digital code which can be
stored on a floppy disk or hard drive. See McGraw, supra note 4, at 150 (explaining how
digitized signal of music can be captured on floppy disk or hard drive, simplifying process of
attaining "ideal" sound). Once stored, the sampler can electronically alter the sounds or play
them back. Id.
36. See David Goldberg & Robert Bernstein, Music Copyrights and the New Technologies, 199
N.Y. LJ. 1, 1-2 (1988) (stating that ability to alter sounds is "limited only by the user's imagination"); Houle, supra note 32, at 881 (discussing samplers' ability, once they have recorded
sounds digitally, to "vary, delete, or reverse certain tonal qualities"); McGiverin, supra note 32,
at 1725 (describing how samplers can convert pitch and timing of sampled notes, while still
preserving notes' distinct tonal qualities).
37. See Considine, supra note 1, at 108-09 (noting that once code is converted back to
sound, sampler may use synthesizer keyboard to play back particular sound when key is hit);
Malloy & Thompson, supranote 35, at 158 (presenting computer with analog/digital circuitry
that enables it to digitize and play back sounds).
38. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing development of sampling
technology).
39. See Sanjek, supranote 22, at 610-11 (stating that dub originated when DJs "began to
chant over the records, scatting or toasting improvised sets of lyrics"). In time, DJs began to
discover that they could also alter various elements such as the bass and vocal tracks or add
reverberation and echo. Id. at 611. The result was dub, a new art form in which live performers
would chant lyrics over a recorded song that had been substantially altered from its original
form. Id.
40. See Sanjek, supranote 22, at 610-11 (describing how portable sound systems in Jamaica
allowed DJs to engage in competitive innovation of dubbing at mobile discotheques).
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by experimenting with early sound4 techniques
that would become
1
precursors to modem-day sampling.
It was not until the digital MIDI synthesizer'2 came on the market
in 1981, the same time that two revolutionary rap albums were
released,4 3 that digital sampling was born.4 As a result of this
technological innovation, the potential for experimentation with
prerecorded music became endless.' 5 The only barrier to such
possibilities was the price of the electronic sampling equipment.' 6
By the mid-1980s, however, sampling technology became more widespread, the prices of sampling equipment decreased, and almost all
artists had sampling equipment at their disposal.47 Consequently,
popular artists have emerged who often rely on sampled material.' s
II.

COPYRIGHT LAW

The Copyright Act of 1976, 9 which is the statutory body of law
governing digital sampling," addresses four main issues: (1) What
qualifies for copyright protection?; (2) If a work qualifies for
41. See Sanjek, supra note 22, at 611 (listing Theodore, Afrika Bambaataa, and Grandmaster
Flash as American DJs who, along with Kool DJ Herc, made dubbing popular practice in 1970s).
These early techniques further evolved in the 1970s as DJs continued to experiment. See id.
(mentioning that early DJs created experimental techniques, such as scratching record quickly
on one groove, emphasizing pulse of records by adding beat box, and allowing one record to
flow into next so that there is no break in music, that have become common on current rap
albums). Being a DJ was artistically limiting, however, because manual dexterity dictated a DJ's
skill. See id.at 612 (noting that because all DJs performed their new techniques manually, speed
of performance limited them in what type of experiments they could do with songs).
42. The system of electrical equipment needed for sampling is often called a Musical
Instrument Digital Interface (MIDI). Sanjek, supranote 22, at 612.
43. See supranote 7 (describing revolution in rap music brought about by albums that relied
on previously recorded music).
44. See Sanjek, supra note 22, at 612 (crediting American company called Sequential Circuits
with engineering first working digital sampling system in 1983); cf. McGraw, supra note 4, at 149
(explaining that first successful experiments with analog-to-digital conversion took place in mid1960s when Dr. Max Mathews at New Jersey's Bell Laboratories constructed computer that
converted analog sounds to digital signals). Unfortunately, the huge cost and size of the
computer confined Dr. Mathews' work to the laboratory. Id.
45. Se supra note 36 (discussing technological capabilities digital sampling presents).
46. See Snowden, supra note 2, at 64 (stating that initially, computerized keyboards needed
for sampling ranged in price from $50,000 to $300,000).
47. See Sanjek, supranote 22, at 612 (explaining that price of MIDI synthesizer has become
low enough for most DJs to afford); Steven Dupler, DigitalSampling Pris,BILLBOARD, Aug. 2,
1986, at 74, 74 (reporting that in 1986, some New York City discount shops were selling Casio's
SK-1 sampling micro-keyboard for just $98); Snowden, supra note 2, at 62 (noting that by late
1980s prices of sampling keyboards had dropped considerably to affordable range).
48. See supranote 8 (discussing popular music's increasing use of sampling).
49. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (protecting "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression" and stating that sound recordings and musical compositions are
"works of authorship"). The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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protection, what rights does the owner of the copyright have with
respect to the work?; (3) What constitutes infringement of that
copyright?; and (4) If infringement is found, what remedies are
available to the copyright owner? This Part addresses each question
separately.
A. What Qualifiesfor Copyright Protection?
The 1976 Copyright Act protects only "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression."5 ' Thus, for a work to
qualify for copyright protection, it must satisfy certain criteria. First,
a "work of authorship" must be at issue. The Act specifically lists
seven categories that constitute works of authorship: literary works;
dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and audiovisual works;
and sound recordings.5 2 Sampled songs are works of authorship
because, as "musical ... works," they fall under the category of
53
"sound recordings."

Second, only "original" works of authorship receive copyright
protection under the Act.54 The Act itself does not define "original";
the courts, however, are in general agreement that the originality
threshold is a very low one.55 In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,56
for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that an author need only contribute something more than a "merely
trivial" variation for the court to consider the work at issue to be

51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. mH
1991).
52. Id.
53. Section 101 of the Act defines "sound recordings" as "works that result from the fixation
of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such
as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
Unlike the sound recording that must be embodied on "disks, tapes, or other phonorecords,"
id., a musical work, which is the actual composition, may be and often is simply written down
as musical notes on paper. See NEIL BOoRsTrN, COF'RIGHT LAW § 2:18 (1981) (discussing
copyrightability of sound recordings). As a result of this distinction, a recorded song has two
separate copyrights, one in the sound recording and the other in the musical work. Id. Often,
two separate companies hold one of the two copyrights. See Note, supra note 26, at 727 (stating
that record companies usually own copyright to sound recordings and that music publishing
companies usually hold musical work copyrights).
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
55. See, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. IrvingJ. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 409-10 (2d Cir.
1970) (stating that "required creativity for copyright is modest at best"), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977
(1971); Moore v. Lighthouse Publishing Co., 429 F. Supp. 1304, 1308 (S.D. Ga. 1977)
(proclaiming that "test of originality is one of low threshold" in case that questioned originality
of city map);Jacobs v. Robitaille, 406 F. Supp. 1145, 1149-50 (D.N.H. 1976) (ruling that only
minimal amount of creativity is necessary to support copyright).
56. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
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original.5 7 The author's work simply has to be "recognizably his
own."' An original work must also possess "independent creation,"
but it need not be invention in the sense of striking uniqueness,
ingeniousness, or novelty.59 Rather, an original work simply must be
a distinguishable creation of the author.'
Third, copyright law does not protect ideas, but expressions of
those ideas in fixed forms.6 ' Thus, only ideas reduced to concrete
form are copyrightable. For example, a copyright extends to the
arrangement of words in a book, but not to the idea conveyed by the
words.62 Similarly, a tune or melody that an individual hums is not
protected. To gain protection, the melody must be recorded.63
B.

Rights of the Copyright Owner

Once an author has met the criteria for establishing a valid
copyright and has completed the proper copyright registration
procedure," the author then has certain exclusive rights under § 106
of the Act with respect to the copyrighted work.' These exclusive

57. L Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976).
58. Id. at 490. L. Batlin & Son, Inc., an importer of "Uncle Sam" piggybanks, attempted
to restrain an importer of similar banks from exercising an allegedly invalid copyright that would
interfere with Batlin's copyright. Id. at 486. The court held that the copyright in question was
in fact invalid because the bank design was too similar to Batlin's bank, despite the fact that one
bank was iron while the other was plastic. Id. at 486-89.
59. Id. at 490; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (holding that statuettes of
male and female dancing figures, although copies of other works of art, were not misuse of
copyright when used as part of manufactured article (bases for lamps) because copyright
protects originality, not novelty).
60. See Dorsey v. Old Surety Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 873 (10th Cir. 1938) (stating that
"[t]o be copyrightable a work must be original in that the author has created it by his own skill,
labor, and judgment").
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (explaining that concept of fixation "determines whether
the provisions of the statute apply to a work"); Maze, 347 U.S. at 217 (repeating well-known
maxim that law protects only expression of idea, not idea itself).
62. See Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D.D.C. 1980) (ruling that
magazine article's reliance on book aboutJohn Wayne did not constitute infringement because
copyright does not protect ideas, but actual form used to express ideas).
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (mandating that work be "fixed in any tangible medium
of expression to be protected"). It should be noted that, as a rule, a recording of an artist's live
performance is not protected under the Copyright Act because a live performance is not fixed.
See id. § 101 (defining performance of work as simply transmission or display of work); see also
McGiverin, supranote 32, at 1727 (stating that copyright protection does not extend to sampling
of live performance). There is, however, an exception to this rule; § 101 states that a "work
consisting of sounds, images, or both that are being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission." 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1988). Thus, an artist can obtain a copyright for a live performance if the performance
is recorded.
64. See Wells, supra note 32, at 694 (describing five-step procedure for copyright
registration, including filing and submitting of application along with filing fee).
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
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rights include the rights to reproduce the work, to prepare derivative
works, and to sell copies of the work to the public.' A copyright's
term lasts for fifty years after the death of the sound recording
67
artist.
A copyright owner's exclusive rights, however, are subject to certain
limitations."8 After the owner authorizes the public distribution of
the copyrighted work any person that complies with the statutory
requirements may obtain a license to "make and distribute
phonorecords of the work." 9 Section 115 of the Copyright Act
defines the scope and requirements of the compulsory license.70
Once a licensee applies for and receives a license to use the copyrighted work, the licensee is entitled to re-create the song.71 The
licensee, however, is neither allowed to reproduce the actual sound
recording72 nor to change significantly the melody or character of
the song.7' The Act provides the copyright owner with compensa-

66.

Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1988) (discussing scope of exclusive rights described in

§ 106).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)-(c) (1988) (setting forth scope of compulsory license entitling
other persons to use of copyrighted work); see also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Remington
Records, Inc., 265 F.2d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that compulsory license is limitation for
copyright owner and privilege for licensee).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1988). Section 115(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed to the
public in the United States under the authority of the copyright owner, any other
person may, by complying with the provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory
license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work. A person may obtain a
compulsory license only if his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to
distribute them to the public for private use. A person may not obtain a compulsory
license for use of the work in the making of phonorecords duplicating a sound
recording fixed by another ....
Id.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988).
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (1988) ("A compulsory license includes the privilege of
making a musical arrangement of the work.
").
72. SeeJondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 395 (3d
Cir.) (stating that identical duplication of original work is not "similar use" as defined by
compulsory license provisions), cert. denie, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Edward B. Marks Music Corp.
v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1974) (deciding that duplicating and
copying copyrighted work is not similar use); Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305, 1310
(9th Cir.) (holding that exact copy of original work "is clearly outside the scope of the
compulsory license scheme") (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Rosner v. Duchess Music
Corp., 409 U.S. 847 (1972).
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2) (1988) (stating that compulsory license is privilege, entitling
licensee to make musical arrangement of copyrighted work without changing "basic melody or
fundamental character" of work). The Act restricts the changes that a person may make to the
original form of the work. Id. In fact, one court has held that the statute only authorizes "use
of the copyrighted work, that is, the written score." Jondora, 506 F.2d at 395.
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tion for the use of the work. 4 Thus, the licensee pays royalty fees
to the copyright owner at royalty rate set by law. v5
In creating this compulsory licensing process, Congress attempted
to strike a balance between two competing interests. On one hand,
Congress wanted to encourage and reward composers for creative and
artistic work; but on the other hand, it wanted to maintain public
access to such works.7" As a result, the Act both limits the copyright
owner's right to withhold the song from the public and provides
77
compensation to the copyright owner for the use of the song.
C. Infringement
Section 501(a) of the Copyright Act provides that "anyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner... is an
infringer of the copyright."'
To show infringement of the copyright, a plaintiff must show proof of ownership of a valid copyright
and demonstrate that the defendants copied the work.79 To prove
actual copying, which is difficult to do, a plaintiff must establish the
following two elements: "(1) defendant's access to the copyrighted
work prior to creation of defendant's work, and (2) substantial
similarity of both general ideas and expression between the copyrighted work and the defendant's work."'

74. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (2) (1988) (stating that copyright owner shall be paid "either two
and three-fourth cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of playing time ....
whichever
amount is larger" for each work copied); id. § 115(c)(4) (providing schedule for royalty
payments, specifying that both monthly and annual statements are required); see also Miller v.
Goody, 125 F. Supp. 348, 350-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that compulsory license on
copyrighted work requires payment to owner for each record manufactured).
75. SeeRecording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 12-13 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (discussing fact that royalty rates are set by Copyright Royalty Tribunal, independent
agency created by Congress and given power to determine rates).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1909) (expressing fear that granting
copyright to creators of musical compositions would encourage monopolization of such
compositions).
77. Jondora,506 F.2d at 395-96 (interpreting goal of compulsory licensing provision as that
of preventing monopolies, not penalizing composer); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Remington
Records, Inc., 265 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that intention of Copyright Act was to
create reasonable compromise between protection of copyright owner from public exploitation
of original work and avoidance of monopolization of musical compositions by owners).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
79. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,614 (7th Cir.), cert.
denled, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
80. Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. Baxter,
484 U.S. 954 (1987).
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Ownership

To prove copyright infringement, the owner of a sound recording
must prove ownership."' Under § 201 of the Act, the author of a
particular work initially receives ownership of the copyright.8 2 In
most cases, then, a copyright owner may prove ownership simply by
showing authorship. 3 Under certain exceptional circumstances,
however, the author of a work is not the owner of the copyright. For
example, if the author were hired to create the work, then the
copyright would rest not in the author, but in the employer for whom
the work was made.
In this instance, the employer must demonstrate that the work was created for hire to establish rightful ownership. 5 Similarly, if the author previously conveyed all or part of the
copyright to someone else, then the new owner has the burden of
proving proper receipt of copyright ownership. 6
2.

Copying

To prove infringement, the plaintiff in a copyright suit must prove
that the defendant copied the sound recording by demonstrating that

81. The owner of a sound recording can prove ownership by producing proof of a
copyright registration certificate. See, e.g., Video Trip Corp. v. Lightning Video, Inc., 866 F.2d
50, 52 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that plaintiff must prove valid ownership of copyright); Sid &
Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating
that proof of ownership is minimal burden on plaintiff because prerequisites for copyright
registration are not complicated); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 340 F. Supp. 899, 90001 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that plaintiff met prima facie evidence of copyright ownership by
producing copyright registration number and publication date).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988) (stating that title is first vested in author(s) of work).
83. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)
(stating that author must simply prove that her work is original composition, owing its origin
to author).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1988) (stating that in work made for hire, employer has title unless
written agreement states otherwise).
85. The work must be made within the scope of employment for an employer to be
considered the owner of a copyright. See, e.g., Murrayv. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (5th
Cir. 1978) (ruling that author who created menu book project while working for corporation
owned copyright instead of employer because work was not created within scope of employment); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Vance, 442 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (D.D.C. 1977)
(declaring that work created by employee of United States within scope of employment belongs
to U.S. Government), af'fd, 589 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part sub noam.
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980); Siegel v. National
Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that comic strip was not
within scope of employment because authors of strip created main character long before
employment relationship with publisher).
86. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (d) (1) (1988) (providing that "[t]he ownership of a copyright may
be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may
be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession"); id. § 201(d) (2) (stating that new copyright owner is entitled to same protection
and remedies as original owner).
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the defendant had "access" to the recording and that the two works
are substantially similar.'7
a. Access
Without proof of access, the similarity between two works may be
purely coincidental.' Courts generally agree that the test for access
is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to view the
copyrighted work.89 In sampling cases, access is rarely an issue
because, by definition, sampling involves the purposeful usurpation
of, and thus access to, another's work."
b.

Substantial similarity

Unlike the access determination, the question of substantial
similarity is an important issue in most sampling cases. 91 The test for
substantial similarity is whether a reasonable person would recognize

87. See, e.g., Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing that to prove copying
plaintiff must show "circumstantial evidence of access to the protected work and ... substantial
similarity of 'ideas' and 'expression' between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing
work"); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614-21 (7th Cir.)
(holding that copying can be inferred by proving access and substantial similarity), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 880 (1982); Herwitz v. NBC, 210 F. Supp. 231, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (stating that
copying is shown by "establishing access and similarity").
88. See Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner & Co., 411 F. Supp. 382, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (stating that access, or inference of access, is shown when defendant's work is virtually
identical to plaintiffs copyrighted work and attributing such similarity to infringement, not
coincidence); Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(holding that similarities in two works constitute "copying rather than coincidence"); Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Sakeld, 340 F. Supp. 899, 901 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (observing that without
access requirement in infringement cases, defendants could contend that similarity between two
works is merely coincidental).
89. See, e.g., Koontzv.Jaffarian, 787 F.2d 906, 910 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding thatworking
relationship between plaintiff and defendant provided defendant with sufficient access to
plaintiff's work for purposes of proving infringement); Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe
Breweries of Can., Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 438 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating test for access as whether
defendant had reasonable opportunity to see or copy protected work); UniversalAthletic Sales,
340 F. Supp. at 901 (holding that test for access was satisfied because defendant had "reasonable
opportunity" to view original work). At issue in this case were wall charts and sketches for
gymnasium exercising equipment. Id. at 900. One defendant admitted in deposition testimony
that he had seen the charts and sketches, that someone had sent him some sketches, and that
he had given the sketches to his artist. Id. at 901.
90. See Note, supranote 26, at 733 n.30 (arguing that access element usually is fulfilled in
sampling cases).
91. Note, supranote 26, at 733-34. The substantial similarity issue becomes contentious
because samplers argue that although they need to use a recognizable portion, the use is de
minimus and thus not an infringement. Id. Courts, however, have consistently held that even
if the use is small, it constitutes infringement if it is "qualitatively important." See, e.g., Baxter
v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir.) (holding that infringement is found if use is
qualitatively important, despite amount of material copied), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v.
Baxter, 484 U.S. 954 (1987); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361
(9th Cir. 1947) (stating that copying of major sequence is enough to constitute infringement),
disapproved on other grounds by F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228
(1952).
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that the defendant took the copyrighted work and incorporated it
into a new work.92 A general impression of similarity is not sufficient
to constitute "substantial" similarity.9 3 Rather, the "total concept"
and "feel" of the two works must be similar.94 At the same time,
however, a copyright owner does not have to show that every small
detail of the protected work was duplicated.9 5 In fact, the duplication of only a small part of the work may be considered substantial if
the part taken was an important and material part of the work. 6
3.

The defense offair use

In determining whether an act constitutes infringement, courts
recognize that certain acts, such as fair use, are defensible. Specifically, § 107 provides an affirmative defense to potential infringers of the
fair use doctrine.9 7 Section 107 does not define "fair use," but
merely lists four factors for courts to weigh in determining whether
the use of a copyrighted work is fair.98 The Act is silent, however, as

92. See Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
substantial similarity exists if "reasonable minds could not differ" when considering likeness
between musical play "Lokey From Maldemar" and motion picture "E.T."), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that district court
properly granted summaryjudgment in copyright infringement claim where no reasonablejuror
could find substantial similarity between two plays).
93. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing
that although toys made by two different toy companies were similar in certain aspects, more
than "general impression of similarity" is needed to demonstrate infringement).
94. Litchfie!4 736 F.2d at 1357. In Warner Bros. v. ABC, 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
affid, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983), owners of movies, comic books, and television shows featuring
"Superman" sued the creators of the television show "The Greatest American Hero" for
copyright infringement. Id. at 1189. The plaintiffs claimed that the Greatest American Hero
had attributes similar to Superman, including super-hearing, super-vision, super-breath, superspeed, and invulnerability. Id. at 1190-91. Additionally, both characters had an alter ego and
encounters with alien beings. Id. at 1191. Despite these similarities, the court ruled that the
"total concept and feel" of the heroes differed. Id. at 1195. Unlike Superman, the Greatest
American Hero was somewhat vulnerable. Id. at 1194-95. He was insecure about his
superpowers and quietly struggled with his new responsibilities. Id. In fact, it was this
vulnerability that often made the show comical, as opposed to the general seriousness of
"Superman." The advertisements for"The Greatest American Hero," for example, said 'He may
be unable to leap tall buildings in a single bound, he may be slower than a speeding bullet, and
he may be less powerful than a locomotive... [but] he'sjust getting started.'" Id.
95. See Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425 (noting that "no bright line rule exists as to what quantum
of similarity is permitted before crossing into the realm of substantial similarity"), cert. denied sub
nom. Williams v. Baxter, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
96. See Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852, 855
(2d Cir.) (ruling that use of one-quarter of musical composition constituted copyright
infringement), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944); Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries
of Can., Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429, 439-40 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that use of small portion of
television commercial may constitute infringement if portion were material and significant).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (establishing guidelines for copying from protected works to
ensure that copying is fair).
98. Id. Section 107 provides, in pertinent part, that a court shall consider:.
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to how much weight courts should allocate to each factor. 9 The
Supreme Court has also provided little guidance, explaining only that
"[s]ection 107 requires a case-by-case determination whether a
particular use is fair."1°"
The first factor listed in § 107 is the purpose and character of the
use.1"' If the work is used for nonprofit educational purposes, for
example, fair use may be presumed. 02 A work used for commercial
The second
purposes, however, would not constitute a fair use.'
consideration is the nature of the copyrighted work." 4 Courts
generally permit the use of a longer portion of a protected work if the
work is an informational collection of facts as opposed to a creative
The third factor is the amount and substantiality of the
piece.'
portion used."tu When determining whether this element has been
met, courts look to the same considerations set forth in the substantial similarity element of infringement; 7 specifically, courts

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id.
99. See id. (listing four factors that constitute fair use doctrine, but not providing guidance
on how to implement those factors). The language of§ 107 is particularly vague. For example,
the four factors to be considered are preceded by the words "shall include." Id. Courts have
struggled with the meaning of fair use because the statute does not provide a bright line rule.
SeeNew Era Publications Int'l v. Carol Publication Group, 904 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir.) (discussing
recent articles that offer suggestions for clarification of fair use doctrine), stay denied, 497 U.S.
1054, and cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990).
100. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
102. Id. (stating in preamble that fair use of copyrighted work includes teaching, scholarship,
or research). Using a work for educational purposes, however, does not necessarily mean that
the use is fair. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983) (arguing that teacher's
use of booklet on cake decorating for home economics class did not automatically require
finding of fair use).
103. Cf Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,419-21,449 (1984) (holding
that video cassette recorders used to make copies for commercial or profitable use would tend
to suggest unfair use).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
105. See DowJones & Co. v. Board of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding
that stock market indices, which are factual compilations, are not creative in nature and may be
distributed without violating copyright).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
107. SeeHarper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,564-65 (1985) (ruling
that although portion of President Ford's book published by defendant was small, portion was
qualitatively important and suggested unfair use); see also supranotes 91-96 and accompanying
text (discussing standards for deciding substantial similarity).
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consider both quantitative and qualitative similarity."0 8 If a court
finds substantial similarity, it generally will find that the use was not
fair.'" The fourth and final factor is the effect of the use on the
potential market for the copyrighted work."0 A use that produces
a negative effect on the sales market for the original work will tend
to deny a finding of fair use."'
D. Remedies
Section 504 of the Copyright Act provides damage awards for the
copyright owner once infringement has been proven.12 The Act
states that the infringer is liable for either actual damages and
profits'1 3 or statutory damages." 4 Actual damages generally are

108. See Consumers Union of United States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant's use of 29 words from article of 2100 words was
insubstantial, and therefore fair use), cert. denie/ 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Roy Expert Co. Establishment v. CBS, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that use offilm excerpts, though
quantitatively small, was qualitatively substantial and goes against finding of fair use), afid 672
F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982). At issue in Roy Expert were excerpts of Charlie Chaplin films owned
by CBS. CBS argued that the scenes "were among Chaplin's best... and [were] central to the
film in which [they] appeared." Roy Expert, 503 F. Supp. at 1145. The trial judge conjectured
that "there would be substantial taking of "Gone With the Wind" if somebody just took the
burning of Atlanta... ten or fifteen minutes of a three or four hour movie." Id.
109. See supranote 108 (presenting cases in which courts found against fair use because two
works were substantially similar).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
111. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that television network's use of plaintiffs' student-produced film biography was not fair use
because network's use significantly reduced potential market for sale of plaintiffs' film).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1988) (stating that copyright infringer is liable for either actual
damages and profits or statutory damages).
113. Id. § 504(b) ("The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered
by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are
attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual
damages."); see also F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952)
(stating that cumulative damage award supports intent of law to compensate copyright owner
and discourage unlawful infringer); Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1375 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding that plaintiff is entitled to both "damages sustained by him and profits
earned by the infringers"); cf. Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983) (warning
that amount ofinfringer's profits, if much greater than actual damages, could constitute windfall
for copyright owner).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988) ("[Tlhe copyright owner may elect, at any time before final
judgment is rendered, to recover, instead ofactual damages and profits, an award of statutory
damages... in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just.")
(emphasis added). If a plaintiff elects to recover statutory damages, he or she is not required
to submit proof of damages or profits, but instead is awarded between $500 and $20,000 at the
court's discretion. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.01[B], at 14-7 n.15
(1993); see Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1177-78 (9th Cir.
1977) (holding that award of statutory damages is within discretion of court). In determining
statutory award, the court must consider "the nature of the copyright, the circumstances of the
infringement, and the like." Sid & Mary KroAi 562 F.2d at 1177-78 (quoting Westermann Co.
v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 106 (1919)).
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measured by the market value of profits lost by the copyright
owner."1
Infringer's profits, which the owner is entitled to, are
determined by deducting certain costs from the infringer's gross
revenue." 6 Statutory damages are available even without evidence
that the plaintiff has suffered actual damages."" The court has wide
discretion in determining the amount of damages as long as it
remains within the statutory limits."'
In addition, injunctive relief is available to copyright owners to
"prevent or restrain infringement" of their copyrighted work." 9
Some courts apply the traditional four-factor test to determine the
appropriateness of injunctive relief. 20 Other courts focus their
inquiry on two of the four factors: the likelihood of success on the
merits and the threat of irreparable injury. 1 Arguably, this test

115. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988).
116. Id.
117. Blackmun v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Harris v.
Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[A] (1983)); Bourne Co. v. Speeks, 670 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D.
Tenn. 1987).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1988). Section 504(c) (1) provides that the trial court may award
between $500 and $20,000 for a single infringement. Id. § 504(c) (1). If the court finds that the
infringement is willful, however, it may increase the award to up to $100,000. Id. § 504(c) (2).
Conversely, if the court finds that the defendant was ignorant and had no reason to believe she
was infringing, the court may reduce the award to $200. Id. The court has the discretion to set
the damages award anywhere within these limits and will only be overturned if it abuses its
discretion. See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that court did
not abuse discretion in awarding statutory amount), cert. denied sub nom. Drebin v. Russell, 446
U.S. 952 (1980); Halnat Publishing Co. v. LAP.A., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 933, 937 (D. Minn. 1987)
(finding that court has discretion in deciding damages as long as amount falls within statutory
limits); Rare Blue Music, Inc. v. Guttadauro, 616 F. Supp. 1528, 1531 (D. Mass. 1985)
(explaining that determining amount of statutory damages lies within "sound discretion of the
court").
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988) ("Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising
under this title may... grant temporary and final injunctions as it may deem reasonable to
prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.").
120. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 613 (7th
Cir.) (stating four factors court considers in granting or denying preliminary injunction), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571,
1575 (D. Minn. 1985) (discussing factors courts should consider before granting injunctive
relief), affd, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). The court in Atai
enumerated the following four factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy at law or will be irreparably
harmed if the injunction does not issue;
(2) whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the
injunction may inflict on the defendant;
(3) whether the plaintiff has at least a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits;
and
(4) whether the granting of a preliminary injunction will disserve the public interest.
Atari, 672 F.2d at 613.
121. See, e.g.,Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that showing of success on merits raises presumption of irreparable harm,
and thus plaintiff need only show likelihood of success on merits to support granting of
injunction); Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that district
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can be reduced to the likelihood of success on the merits. 122
Finally, if the court finds that the infringement is willful, the court
can impose criminal sanctions."
Courts are split, however, on the
question of what level of intent constitutes willfulness. Some courts
hold that only a general intent to act constitutes willfulness, even if
the defendant did not realize that he or she was acting in an illegal
manner; other courts require a specific intent to break the law.'24
III.

THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING DIGITAL SAMPLING

A. The Debate Over SubstantialSimilarity
The legality of unauthorized digital sampling has divided the music
industry. One issue that has caused much debate is the role of
"substantial similarity" in a digital sampling suit.125 The controversy
arises over the use of the word "actual" in § 114(b) 126 of the
court properly considered likelihood of success on merits and possibility of irreparable harm in
granting preliminary injunction); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521,52126 (9th Cir. 1984) (awarding preliminary injunction because court found likelihood of success
on merits and threat of irreparable harm); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Venture Int'l, Inc.,
543 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (ruling that plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable
injury and likelihood of success on merits in order to receive injunctive relief); Stern Elecs., Inc.
v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (granting video game distributor preliminary
injunction based on showing of irreparable harm and probability of success on merits), affd,669
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
122. See NIMMER, supranote 114, § 14.06[A], at 14-87 n.30 (discussing that test can basically
be reduced to showing likelihood of success on merits because prima facie case of infringement
presumes irreparable harm).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
124. Compare United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943) (finding willful
infringement where there was overwhelming evidence that defendant had intent to make copies
for profit) and United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1010-18 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (finding willful
infringement without express finding that defendant knowingly violated law), af/'din par vacated
in par 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1040 (1977) with United States v. Wise,
550 F.2d 1180, 1194-95 (9th Cir.) (findingwillfulness only because appellant knew that films that
he sold had not been previously sold by copyright owner), cert. denied 434 U.S. 929 (1977) and
United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (requiring specific intent for willful
infringement of copyright).
125. It is well settled, as a general rule of copyright law, that a plaintiff must show substantial
similarity between the two works in order to prove infringement. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text (stating that substantial similarity is element of case for infringement). What
is not settled, however, is how the concept of substantial similarity applies to digital sampling.
See McGraw, supra note 4, at 161-62 (discussing how much similarity may be needed for digital
sampling to constitute infringement); Houle, supra note 32, at 891-92 (showing conflict between
desire of courts not to enjoin work simply because it uses small portion of another song and
public policy that plagiarism never should be excused, no matter how small the infringement);
Note, supra note 26, at 734 (providing different ways to judge substantial similarity).
126. Section 114(b) provides in pertinent part:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1)
of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of
phonorecords, or of copies of motion pictures and other audiovisual works, that
directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording.
17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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Copyright Act." On one hand, this term can be viewed as prohibiting the usurpation of any exact sound from a song.18 But on the
other hand, a plaintiff in a copyright suit must demonstrate substantial similarity between the two works in order to prove infringement' m This substantial similarity requirement thus suggests that
the Copyright Act might allow some actual use of a copyrighted song
without that use rising to the level of infringement.
Sampling advocates focus on the substantial similarity requirement.
They suggest that while § 114(b) does protect actual sounds, samplers'
technological capability to alter sounds"s changes sampled sounds
to such a degree that a sampler can change them to completely new
sounds.'
Sampling advocates argue that despite the fact that
samplers use the actual sounds, most sampled recordings do not
contain enough similarity to constitute infringement.1 2
In response, some sampling critics have argued that the question of
substantial similarity does not apply to digital sampling nor to whether
a sampler's work constitutes infringement.'
Instead, they argue
that the test to determine infringement should consider whether

127. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
128. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 7, at 776 (discussing argument that inclusion of word
"actual" in § 114(b) explicitly prohibits use of exact sounds from copyrighted work); McGiverin,
supranote 32, at 1731-32 (concluding that digital sampling is taking of actual sounds under §
114); Wells, supra note 32, at 701 (implying that appropriation of actual sounds constitutes
infringement regardless of how sampler uses them).
129. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing test of substantial similarity in
infringement cases).
130. See supranote 36 (describing myriad ways sampler can alter or manipulate sounds).
131. See Bynam, supra note 35, at 375-76 (stating that samples often are altered before use);
Dupler, supra note 13, at 74 ("'In defense of sampling, it should be pointed out that with the
exception of a very few units, most samplers do not re-create exact sonic pictures of what is
sampled.... You usually use the sample as a base sound and then process it, filter it, play with
it, to make it sound better.'") (quoting Bobby Nathan, co-owner of Unique Records).
132. See Sherri C. Hampel, Comment, Are Samplers Gettinga Bum Rap?: CopyrightInfringement
or Technological Creativiy?,1992 U. ILL L. REV. 559, 573-74 (arguing that digital sampling devices
are musical instruments that create unique musical sounds or interpretations that simulate, but
are distinct from, actual sounds). If accepted as true, Hampel's argument satisfies § 114(b),
which provides that there is no copyright protection for "the making or duplication of another
sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though
such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording." 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)
(1988) (emphasis added). Hampel argues that a digital sampler is a distinct musical instrument
because it receives sounds, converts them to digital bits, and re-creates them in some altered
form. See Hampel, sup-a, at 572-73. Thus, she argues that, technically, the sampling process
does not use actual sounds, but rather digitally interpreted sounds, creating an "independent
fixation" of the sounds. Id. Under this interpretation, digital sampling is no more illegal under
§ 114(b) than a guitarist playing a previously recorded song. Id. at 573-74.
133. See Thom, supranote 15, at 326 (presenting argument that substantial similarity test is
inapplicable to sound recordings); cf. United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (C.D. Cal.
1974) (finding that substantial similarity test is irrelevant in infringement determination).
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someone has used the exact sounds of a copyrighted song.'3 Thus,
if an individual has used the actual sounds of a copyrighted song, that
person should be found liable for infringement, regardless of how
much he or she altered the original sound."a 5
This debate typically involves a discussion of United States v.
Taxe.13 6 In that case, the owners of sound recordings claimed that
the defendants violated copyright law when they sold "pirated" copies
of the plaintiff's songs.137 The court upheld the claim, ruling that
even though the defendants had altered the songs before selling
them, they still had illicitly duplicated the work."
Each side in the sampling debate interprets Taxe differently.
Sampling opponents claim that the test for infringement turns on
whether the actual sounds were used.13 9
only one question:
Sampling proponents, on the other hand, point out that while the
court of appeals upheld the district court's judgment in granting the
plaintiff's claim, it also ruled that the lower court's per se rule-that
all use of actual sounds constitutes infringement-was erroneous. 4°

134. SeeThom, supranote 15, at 326 (suggesting that substantial similarity test does not apply
to sampling by virtue of fact that Copyright Act forbids use of actual sound recordings). But see
Wells, supranote 32, at 701 (arguing that traditional test for infringement-ownership, copying,
and illicit copying-must be applied in cases of digital sampling).
135. Wells, supranote 32, at 701.
136. 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
137. United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040
(1977). Richard Taxe was one of four defendants who directed an operation that purchased
records from retail outlets and later resold them. Id. at 964. The defendants would obtain
stereo eight-track tape recordings manufactured by major record companies and then re-record
the records with special equipment that would allow them to alter the originals by changing the
speed of the recording, adding reverberation and other synthesizer sounds, and eliminating or
reducing in volume some of the sounds from the songs. Id. Once the songs were ready to sell,
the defendants would promote them through national advertising, claiming that they were
authentic. Id.
138. See id. at 966 (using lower court's reasoning to find infringement because of
unauthorized duplication despite any alteration in sound). The lower court held that the
changes made in the sound recording were inaudible "to the human ear and were intended to
be so." United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated in
par 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977). Consequently, the court
held that the alterations had minimal effect on the question of infringement. Id. at 1014-15.
Furthermore, the trial court held that the alterations had no bearing on the case because the
only relevant question was whether the use of the work was an appropriation of the actual
sounds or a mere imitation. Id. at 1014 (ruling that "substantial similarity" has no relevance to
question of infringement).
139. See Note, supra note 26, at 736 (explaining that Taxe suggests that unauthorized
sampling would be actionable despite alterations of original song).
140. Taxe, 540 F.2d at 965. The lower court expressed its per se rule in ajury instruction
that told the jurors to consider only whether the defendant used actual sounds. See Taxe 380
F. Supp. at 1014-15 (discussingjury instructions that askedjury to consider whether defendants'
works were re-recording or new and independent fixation). The court of appeals later said, "We
believe the instruction went beyond the law insofar as it purported to characterize any and all
re-recordings as infringements . ... " Taxe 540 F.2d at 965. The court of appeals did not
reverse thejudgment, however, because the rest of the instruction did allow the jury to consider
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Supporters argue that the higher court's denunciation of this rule
suggests that the use of actual sounds may be legal if the use is not
significant." As a result, some sampling proponents interpret Taxe
as implying that the Copyright Act permits digital sampling if the use
is not substantial."
If this interpretation of Taxe is correct, the next logical step is to
define "substantial." Advocates of sampling argue that sampling often
uses such a small, insubstantial amount of actual sounds from another
work that most sampled songs are protected by the fair use doctrine."' Some supporters of sampling thus call for a quantitative
approach to whether a use is fair, arguing that substantiality is
determined by the amount of material that is taken from another
song.'"
Others in the industry disagree, arguing that a qualitative approach
is more important for the purpose of deciding substantiality."
A
qualitative approach is less concrete. It forsakes numbers and
amounts for the abstract importance that the particular musical
phrases have on how listeners remember and associate songs. Under
this test, even the use of a quantitatively small portion of a song can
be an unfair use if that portion is materially important to the
song. 146 For example, under a qualitative approach, use of only one

the substantial similarity question, thereby curing the error in the earlier part of the instruction.
Id.
141. See Marcus, supranote 7, at 777 n.63 (reporting entertainment lawyer Ken Anderson's
view that Taxe stands for proposition that literal copying is not automatically infringement
because some smaller portions will be considered de minimis). Mr. Anderson argues that, under
Taxe, copying "'must be substantially similar to the original recording as a whole'" to be
regarded as infringement. Id.
142. See Marcus, supranote 7, at 777 n.62 (noting that Taxe court expressed view that trivial
re-recording is too insubstantial to constitute infringement).
143. S&esupranotes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing premise that use of only small
portion of song may not constitute infringement under fair use doctrine). For example, rap
artists often use only small parts of sampled material in small parts of their songs. See Sanjek,
supranote 22, at 613 (stating that "[m]ost often the amount of sampling, particularly on rap
recordings, is minimal, the emphasis being laid on the rap itself and the beat supporting it;
excessive sampling might be felt to intrude upon the vocal performance").
144. This argument relies on the Act's specific use of the word "amount" in factoring
whether something is a fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (providing that "amount and
substantiality of the portion used" is third factor in deciding fair use).
145. See Note, supranote 26, at 734 (stating that "it seems logical to conclude that even a
short sample of a musical composition might be an infringing use if the sample was recognizable
by comparing the two works and was 'important' to its source."); Marsha A. Willis, Comment,
UnauthorizedDigitalSound Samplin& The Taking Ofa ConstitutionalRight 17 S.U. L REv. 309, 317
(1990) (arguing that "qualitative approach should be taken in analyzing the sampling").
146. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565-66 n.8 (1985)
(ruling that, although defendant took only 300 words out of former President Ford's book, there
was no fair use because portion played important role in defendant's publication, thus
constituting qualitatively important excerpt); Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1209-13
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (deciding whether use of quantitatively small portion of book was qualitatively
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measure of a song would satisfy the substantial similarity test if that
measure were a signature phrase, one of the best known and
recognizable parts of the song. This approach, while perhaps less
concrete and less workable than the quantitative test, may produce a
more accurate comparative analysis by returning the inquiry to the
1 47
essence of the music.
Finally, people on both sides of the argument debate whether a
song that employs digital sampling is so recognizably similar to the
Samplers argue that
original song as to constitute infringement."
they often alter the sampled sounds to such a degree that a reasonable listener likely would not recognize that one song borrowed from
the other. 49 Samplers also defend sampling by arguing that the art
form inherently requires uniquely recognizable sounds derived from
other works. 5 ° Yet, when samplers admit that they use recognizably

important for purposes of deciding fair use), affid in part, rev'd in part,560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
147. The quantitative versus qualitative debate has also divided the courts. CompareSheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.) (rejecting quantitative approach by
holding that " [n ] o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not
pirate"), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) with Brodsky v. Universal Pictures Co., 149 F.2d 600,
600-01 (2d Cir. 1945) (rejecting plaintiff's copyright infringement claim because extent of
similarity between plaintiff's song and defendant's song was only few measures) and Carew v.
RIY.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 199, 201 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (ruling against plaintiff
because parts of copyrighted song defendant used were too short in length to constitute
infringement) andDavilla v. Harms, 36 F. Supp. 843, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (holding that "slight
resemblance in the progression of a few bars in both compositions... is not enough to make
out a case of piracy").
148. See, e.g., Houle, supra note 32, at 893 (noting that some argue that only four
recognizable measures constitute infringement); McGiverin, supra note 32, at 1735 (questioning
"whether a taking of no more than a few notes is de minimus"); Thom, supra note 15, at 328-29
(presenting controversy over whether law should use entire song as reference point for
recognizability test or whether it should examine song component by component, looking
individually at each instrument and vocalist).
149. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing argument that samplers
drastically change original sampled sounds).
150. See Considine, supranote 1, at 107 ("[What makes sampling so attractive isn't that it's
easier to pinch ajames Brown scream than to learn how to make that sound yourself. Rather,
it's the fact that there's something immediately recognizable about that scream, that it carries
a specific association: Soul Brother No. 1."); Dupler, supra note 13, at 74 (explaining that
producer/remixer used drummerJohn Bonham's kick drum from Led Zeppelin's "Houses of
the Holy" in latest album because of its uniqueness); Rule, supra note 7, at C18 (restating
industry attorney's belief that rap music, in order to be pure and true to its genre, requires use
of earlier works, and "business concerns" should not interfere with this); Songwriter Wins Large
Settlement in Rap Suit, LA TiMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at Fl (reporting comment of record company
executive, Dan Charas, that "it's difficult to apply conventional pop copyright laws to rap
because there is artistry in taking the electronic samples").
Sampling critics, however, may challenge the argument that sampling is an art form that
inherently relies on other people's works. As proof that sampling does not need to use previous
songs, critics might point to evidence that many rappers are abandoning sampling and are now
using their own musicians in their songs. See Leland, supra note 7, at 55 (quoting popular
rapper/sampler Prince Paul as stating, "'I [now] have a trumpet player, a guitar player, a bass.
No samples'"); Rule, supranote 7, at C18 (noting that rapper L.L. CoolJ recently toured with
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unique portions of songs, they refute their own argument that
sampling often fails to meet the substantial similarity test.
B.

The Debate Over Originality

Proponents of sampling often argue that sampling is no different
from other art forms that rely on older works, and should thus be
accorded the favorable legal treatment that these other art forms
presently receive.'-" They do not understand why samplers are
penalized when other artists also borrow from earlier works of art

his own band rather than use samples and that Hammer's most recent album, "Too Legit to
Quit" does not contain samples). If rap music's creativity continues to flourish without the use
of sampling, then it is possible that sampling never was an original art form, but rather was only
an excuse to cut music production costs. But see Rule, supranote 7, at C18 (presenting Ken
Anderson's hope that increased use of musicians in rap music has resulted from natural
evolution of music and not for legal reasons).
151. See Rule, supra note 7, at C13, 018 (quoting entertainment lawyer Ken Anderson who
argues that other forms of art traditionally have relied on previous material and yet are
considered original by general public). Anderson states: "A comedian parodying something
pre-existing-a book, a movie or someone's life-has got to make a reference to it for the
parody to work. If copyright law prevented that, it would be destroying a form of creative art
and that would not be in keeping with the purpose of the copyright law. The same principle
applies to the way certain rap composers intentionally refer to prior recordings.'" Id. at 018.
Some authors also suggest that the originality of digital sampling may be viewed in much the
same way as the originality in modem visual art. Marcus, supra note 7, at 772. Like Andy
Warhol's paintings of Campbell's soup cans in the 1960s, digital sampling involves the
reinterpretation of earlier works in a new context. Id. This concept of art "forces the viewer
or listener to question and rethink commercial presentation and materialism in society." Id.
In fact, even before the pop art era, the cubist movement of the early twentieth century gave
rise to the collage, which pieced together fragments of actual objects into one single work of art.
ADEt.-mID M. GEALT, LOOKINGAT ART: AVisrrOt's GUIDE TO MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 436 (1983).
Similarly, the surrealism movement of 1924-1940 relied on techniques that put recognizable
objects into new contexts to give them new meaning. Id. at 443.
Geat argues that digital sampling is similar to these forms of art because it takes pieces of
previous works and recombines them to create a new work. Id. Dan Chamas, director of
promotion at Def American Records, believes that there is art in taking samples of earlier works
and putting them into new settings. Chuck Philips, Songuniter Wins Large Settlement in Rap Sui
LA. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at Fl, F2. Philips laments the fact that the U.S. legal system does not
seem to have the capacity to see such art. Id.
Some suggest that the heavy criticism rap music and sampling receive stems from racial
prejudice. David Browne, No Free Sampes?, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, Jan. 24, 1992, at 54, 56;
Ressner, supranote 4, at 105 (noting that some observers, such as sound engineer Bilal Bashir,
argue that people seize upon "any little loophole" to criticize rap and sampling because "(r]ap
is black art"). Others believe that the public associates rap with the gang violence it sees on the
television news and thus feels threatened by rap. Robert Hilbum, Gettinga Bad Rap,LA. TIMES,
June 24, 1990, (Calendar), at 8, 68. Unfortunately, people often fail to look at the positive
messages that many rap artists express in their music. Id. For example, various rap artists,
including Chuck D., Boogie Down Productions' KRS-One, and Kool Moe Dee, joined together
to produce "Self-Destruction," a rap album calling for education and aimed at reducing the
number of crimes committed by blacks against blacks. Id. Similarly, Hammer (formerly M.C.
Hammer), Ice-T, and members of the rap group N.W.A. released the anti-gang album, THE
WEST COAST RAP ALL-STARS, WE'RE ALL INTHE SAME GANG (Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 1990).
Hilburn, supraat 8. Hilburn argues that, despite these efforts, society has not come to tolerate
rap as it eventually did with the once-threatening rock n' roll, primarily because rap is a "black
medium." Id. at 8.
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without criticism. 52 They maintain that all artists borrow from past
works153 and assert that even great composers such as Bach, Handel,
and Vivaldi borrowed from preexisting works.'4
Sampling proponents contend that the legal community must
rethink and reevaluate its concept of originality to fit modem musical

152. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting defendant Biz Markie's argument for acquittal, which failed, that
everybody else in music industry samples); see also Rule, supra note 7, at C13 ("'Probably 99
percent of drum samples out there are not cleared ... . Everyone takes beats from other songs,
adds things over them, amplifies them, does anything they have to do to make their own
track.'") (quoting music industry attorney Lawrence Stanley). But see United States v. Slapo, 285
F. Supp. 513, 513-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that custom and practice in music industry of
using music books that illegally print song compositions do not invalidate criminal copyright
laws); Considine, supranote 1, at 107 (stating, humorously, "as our mothers used to point out,
the fact that everyone else is doing something doesn't make it right for us to do it").
153. See supra note 5 (discussing argument that few, if any, works of art are completely
original and borrow nothing from past).
154.

See PAUL HENRY LANG, GEORGE FRIDERIC HANDEL 561-69 (1966) (stating that music's

history is filled with composers who borrowed from past works). During the English
Renaissance, it was believed that "originality of real worth [could] ... be achieved only through
creative imitation." HAROLD
RENAISSANCE 202 (1965).

0.

WHITE, PLAGIARISM AND IMITATION DURING THE ENGLISH

In the early twentieth century, Igor Stravinsky made an art form out of the neoclassical
tradition of "borrowing" from previous materials. ROBERT P. MORGAN, TWENTIETH-CENTURY
MUSIC: A HISTORY OF MUSICAL STYLE IN MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 168-79 (1991).

In his

1920 ballet, "Pulcinella," Stravinsky so completely reworked music written by the eighteenthcentury composer Pergolesi that Stravinsky's entire ballet was composed of portions of
Pergolesi's music. Id. at 170-72. As Stravinsky explained, his use of previous works represented
his "discovery of the past." Id. at 171 (quoting IGOR STRAVINSKY & ROBERT CRAFt, ExPOSrIONs

AND DEVELOPMENTS 128-29 (1962)). Stravinsky eventually "discovered" nearly every period of
Western musical history. Id. at 173.
Other twentieth-century composers also used previous material in their music. Charles Ives
created entire vocal lines out of fragments of other people's songs. Id. at 143. In his 1960
opera, "Die Soldaten" (revised version, 1964), Bernd Alois Zimmermann directly quoted a Bach
fugue, a Gregorian Chant, and conventional jazz figures. Id. at 411. Peter Maxwell Davies based
almost all of his work on borrowed music from the pre-Baroque era. Id. at 415. This list is not
exhaustive.
Many famous rock and roll musicians also have used sounds and songs created by others for
their songs. For example, the Beach Boys relied so heavily on Chuck Berry's "Sweet Little
Sixteen" for their song "Surfing U.S.A." that Chuck Berry was credited as a coauthor of the
latter. Snowden, supra note 2, at 71-72. David Byrne of the Talking Heads used sounds from
preachers and radio programs on his 1981 solo album, "My Life in the Bush." Id. at 71.
Further, the Chiffons successfully sued George Harrison, claiming that he copied the melody
from their song "He's So Fine" for his early 1970s hit "My Sweet Lord". Id. at 72.
Long before digital sampling, the music business fabricated musical acts that copied from
earlier acts. Thom, supra note 15, at 325-26. For example, in the 1950s, the music industry was
filled with "crooners" imitating Frank Sinatra's style. Id. In the mid-1970s, the success of the
rock group KISS caused an influx of heavy metal bands "imitating their image." Id. at 326. In
the late 1970s, when Van Halen's albums climbed the charts, a cornucopia of guitarists copied
Eddie Van Halen's style. Id. at 325.
In sum, musicians have a history of relying on past works. As one music historian once wrote:
"Tradition, where music is concerned, has no need of a capital T. In the house of music it is
neither an idol nor a guest of honour nor even a steward, because here it is at home. Modest
and indispensable, musical tradition is the very substance of music." Fred Goldbeck, TwentiethCentury Composers and Tradition, in TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC 23 (Rollo H. Myers ed., 1968).
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They suggest that the public must overcome the

notion that adoption of existing music is automatically unoriginal and
recognize the art of reusing existing music. Ironically, while calling

for a new definition of originality, samplers could also refer to the
traditional common-law notions of originality that would further
bolster their arguments. To be considered original under common-

law doctrine,
a work need only be an "independent creation," not a
156
"novelty."

Samplers thus could argue that their works are
57
independent creations and not just copies of older works.
On the other hand, this argument based on artistic originality
might be out of place in a legal context because it has been held that
"artistic originality is not the same thing as the legal concept of
originality in the Copyright Act." '
In Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,'59 the Seventh Circuit held that although a slight change or
diversion from the original work might constitute artistic originality,
it does not necessarily constitute legal originality."6 Consequently,
samplers' claims that their works are original and independent
creations might be misplaced because they focus on artistic originality,
not legal originality.
Moreover, in Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp.,' the
Second Circuit held that a work completely identical to another work
can still be considered an original, independent creation.1 62 The
similarity, however, cannot be the result of copying. 6 s This deci-

155. See Finell, supra note 35, at 5 (stating that one challenge facing digital sampling is
applying legal definition of originality).
156. See supranotes 59-60 and accompanying text (explaining that author must create work
using only personal artistic talents for copyright to be granted).
157. Greg Tate, Diary of a Bug, VILLAGE VoICE, Nov. 22, 1988, at 73 ("[M]usic belongs to the
people, and sampling isn't a copycat act but a form of reanimation."); see Browne, supranote
151, at 54-56 (noting sophistication of sampling records due to number of different "snippets"
that often appear in songs).
158. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983).
159. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
160. Id. at 304. In Gracen, an artist made a painting of Judy Garland as Dorothy from the
movie "The Wizard of Oz" and a series of drawings. The artist then entered these works in a
competition for a contract to paint collector plates. Id. at 301. The artist won the competition,
but refused the contract and later used the paintings to solicit artistic commissions. Id. at 302.
MGM, the owner of the movie, sued the artist, claiming that her use of the Judy Garland-asDorothy painting for the purpose of soliciting commissions was a violation of the movie's
copyright. Id.
161. 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977).
162. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v.Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (2d Gir. 1977)
(citing I MELVILLE B. NIMMEP & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPIUGHT § 10.1, at 34 (1976)).
163. Id. at 1092-94. Novelty Textile Mills involved an upholstery manufacturer that sued a
competing manufacturer for allegedly infringing on the former's design. Id. at 1092. The court
of appeals found that the main issue in the case was one of substantial copying, which may be
proven by showing both access to the original design and substantial similarity between the two
designs. Id. The court ruled that Joan Fabrics had access and that the two designs were
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sion, like the one in Taxe,'" appears to overlook questions of artistic
creativity and similarity, focusing instead on the issue of actual
copying to decide whether a work is original. 1" Novelty Textile Mills
lends support to the argument that the dissimilarity or artistic
originality of a work is irrelevant." The fact remains that copying
from another work is copyright infringement.
C. The Debate Over the Effect of Sampling on a Song's Market
The effect that sampling has on a song's potential market is one
element courts use to decide whether the use of the song is a fair
one. 7 It is an affirmative defense for one accused of copyright
infringement to argue that the infringement did not adversely affect
the market for the copyrighted song."6 Given that digital samplers
often borrow from older songs, 169 samplers argue that use of these
songs does not adversely affect their potential market because the
people who would buy these older songs will not buy rap albums in
their place.'
Therefore, even if it is conceded that sampling is a
copyright infringement, it is still a fair use because it does not harm

substantially similar. Id. at 1092-94.
164. See United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that altering songs
can still constitute illegal duplication), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1040 (1977).
165. Novelty Textile Mills, 558 F.2d at 1092-93 (maintaining that direct copying is difficult to
prove and that plaintiff may prove copying by showing defendant's access to work and
substantial similarity between two works).
166. See Snowden, supra note 2, at 62 ("'I don't deny the creativity of the people putting
[sampled works] together any more than I deny the creativity of the collage artist. That doesn't
change the question of whether these people have an ownership interest in the underlying works
they've used.'") (quoting Bruce Gold, sampling critic and attorney).
167. See supra note 98 (listing effect on potential market as one of four factors courts
consider when determining copyright infringement under § 107).
168. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845 (1 lth
Cir. 1990) (stating that effect on market test is part of affirmative defense of fair use);
Supermarket of Homes v. San Fernando Valley Bd., 786 F.2d 1400, 1408-09 (9th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that "affirmative defense to infringement of fair use is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107,"
which includes "effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work"); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031,
1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (noting that effect on market test is one of four factors that provides "a
framework for the court's analysis of the defendant's affirmative defense"); see also supra notes
110-11 and accompanying text (explaining that little to no effect on potential market for
copyrighted work generally will lead to finding of fair use).
169. See Marcus, supra note 7, at 784 n.119 (commenting that most sampled records are old
funk or rock hits); Note, supranote 26, at 738 n.59; A New Bagfor Hip-Hop, NEWSDAY, Apr. 19,
1990, § II, at 11 (stating that many samplers look to civil rights era as way to connect with
historical sounds of previous African-American artists). The rap and the sampled song upon
which the rap is based thus attract two different age groups and listening audiences. Note, supra
note 26, at 738 n.59. Still, rap artists have recently begun to sample fellow rappers. See Marcus,
supra note 7, at 784 n.119 (stating that trend of rappers sampling fellow rappers is increasing).
170. See Note, supra note 26, at 738 n.59 (admitting that sampling usually does not damage
original song's market because "song containing samples in a wholly new environment will
hardly serve as a substitute for the original with the potential to dissipate its market").
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the market for the original song. 7' In fact, some argue that
sampling actually helps the potential market
for older songs by
172
reviving interest in relatively forgotten music.
Critics of sampling could suggest, however, that a market analysis
that only examines the effect on the original song is incomplete
because it fails to account for the effect on other potential or
derivative uses of the song. 73 For example, if the owner of an older
song re-released the song as a rap version, any prior sampling would
affect the market for that derivative work by potentially interfering
with sales of the owner's new version." In this way, sampling may
hurt the market for protected songs, thus proving to be an unfair use
of the original songs.

171. The district court in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D.
Tenn.), appeal dimissed, 929 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992),
cert. granted in part; 113 S. Ct 1642 (1993), heard a claim by the owner of the Roy Orbison hit,
"Oh, Pretty Woman," alleging that the rap group 2 Live Crew infringed the song's copyright
when it used the song in "Pretty Woman," the group's parody of the original song. Id. at 1152.
The district court held that 2 Live Crew's use of the Roy Orbison hit was a fair use, partly
because the rap song would not likely damage the potential market for the old song. Id. at
1158. The court stated that the "intended audience for the two songs is entirely different. The
odds of a record collector seeking the original composition who would also purchase the 2 Live
Crew version are remote." Id. But see Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 143839 (6th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's decision and holding that effect-on-market-test
analysis that focuses solely on fact of two different listening audiences is incomplete because it
fails to consider market for derivative works as well), cert. grantedin part; 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993);
see also infra note 173 and accompanying text (defining "derivative work" and explaining that
effect-on-market analysis must also consider song's market for derivative works).
172. See Marcus, supranote 7, at 784 (admitting that sampling may help song by exposing
it to wider market and re-creating interest, thereby stimulating sales); Note, supranote 26, at 738
(stating that original song's market is likely to dissipate after several years); Jeffrey JoisonColburn, Recession or CreativeStagnation: Execs PonderLower Music Shipment, BIlBOARD, Nov. 2,
1991, at 3 (citing MCA Music Entertainment Group Chairman Al Teller as noting music
industry's propensity to create one-hit wonders which are quickly forgotten). Popular recording
artist BillyJoel once sang, "But I know the game, and you'll forget my name and I won't be here
in another year if I don't stay on the charts." Hear BILLYJOEt, The Entertainer,on STREEIiFE
SERENADE (Columbia Records/CBS 1974). The music industry does indeed have a high attrition
rate. For this reason, many older songs are forgotten. Sampling may help their sales.
173. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as follows:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
The Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1984),
held that a fair use analysis must take into account both the effect on the market for the
copyrighted work and the effect on the market for derivative works. Id. at 568. Thus, an
analysis that focuses solely on the copyrighted work itself is flawed. Id.
174. The Second Circuit has held that whether an artist has any present intention of creating
such a derivative work is immaterial for purposes of the effect-on-the-market test. See Salinger
v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir.) (ruling that authors are entitled to protect
opportunity to sell their works), cert. denied 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
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Furthermore, critics of sampling could argue that sampling
adversely affects the potential market for musicians because it uses
computerized sounds instead of studio musicians, thus replacing the
need for musicians and putting them out of work. 175 Not only is
sampling less expensive than hiring live musicians, but the digital
technology also produces a better sound than that created by a live
have endured a
studio musician. 76 As a result, studio 1 musicians
77
sharp decline in demand for their work.
Advocates of sampling could respond by asserting that § 107 does
not mention the effect on the potential market for the musician.
Rather, the Act only mentions the effect on the market for the actual
work. 71 Under this approach, while the effect on the common
studio musician is unfortunate, it has no bearing on the question of
fair use.

D. The Copyright Act's Ambiguous Legislative History
Both sides of the digital sampling debate have interpreted the
language of the Copyright Act differently when arguing whether
digital sampling constitutes copyright infringement. Attempting to
find answers in the Act's legislative history, however, is difficult.
When Congress last made major changes to the Act in 1976,179
digital sampling did not exist. 8 ° Any analysis of legislative history
thus can only speculate on what Congress would have done had it
considered digital sampling. As a result, the Act's legislative history
has spawned further debate over how Congress would have responded
to digital sampling.
175. See Newton, supra note 33, at 712 (mentioning that sampling may damage market for
musicians); McGiverin, supra note 32, at 1726 (positing that percussionists, bassists, and brass
and string players have been hardest hit because samplers have had greatest success copying
these sounds); Wells, supra note 32, at 700 (worrying that previously created, sampled sounds
are replacing actual musicians, which may have "devastating" impact on musicians' livelihoods).
McGiverin uses the artful term "self-competition" to describe how the market for these musicians
is being adversely affected by their own previous recordings. McGiverin, supra note 32, at 1726
n.22.
176. See supra note 36 (describing digital sampling capabilities that allow sampler to correct
pitch of notes, thereby improving sound).
177. See Newton, supranote 33, at 674 n.14 (pointing out that even as early as 1985, finding
employment was difficult for musicians); Allan Jalon, Wil Synthesizers Put Musicians Out of
Business?,ANN ARBOR NEwS, Dec. 28, 1985, at B1 (noting statistical evidence showing that as of
1986, synthesizers were creating at least 50% of all music on television and that recording jobs
for musicians had declined by about 35%).
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988) (listing "the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyighted work" as factor in fair use test) (emphasis added).
179. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1988)).
180. See Sanjek, supranote 22, at 612 (explaining that digital sampling did not enter market
until 1981).
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Supporters of sampling, such as prominent entertainment lawyer
Ken Anderson, have said that we should "err on the side of artistic
freedom."'8 1 Congress has stated repeatedly that the main purpose
of the Copyright Act is the public good of use and access to works of
art,1 2 even if providing this public good comes at the expense of
the author of a work.'
Thus, sampling advocates could infer that
samplers should have legal access to songs and that such access should
take precedence over any monopolistic claims that the owners of

those songs might assert." 4
Critics of sampling could respond that a public policy of allowing
access to copyrighted works does not include profiting from the
exploitation of another's work.Y Although the policy of public

181. See Ressner, supranote 4, at 104 (maintaining that it is impossible to be both pro-artist
and anti-sampling).
182. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciay, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, 65 (1965) [hereinafter
Hearings on Copyright] (statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights,
accompanied by Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register) (stating that basic role of copyright law is
protection of "public interest"); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (declaring
that copyright law is "[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit
of the public").
183. SeeTwentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (indicating that
goal of public access to works outweighs that of protection of author's ownership rights). In
Twentieth Century Musi, the Court held:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to serve a fair return
for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good.
Id. at 156.
One legal scholar has also espoused the idea that if an author's private interests conflict with
the public interest, then the latter must prevail. See ALAN LATMAN Er Ai., COPYRIGHT FOR THE
EIGHTIES: CASES AND MATERiALS 13 (1985) (recognizing that there are situations where
copyright restrictions would hurt public dissemination of works and that, in those situations,
"interests of authors must yield to the public welfare"); see also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469
U.S. 153, 157 (1985) (stating that fundamental objective of "copyright laws requires providing
incentives both to the creation of works of art and to their dissemination").
184. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (stating
that although immediate goal of copyright laws is to reward creators, ultimate goal is to
"stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good"); Marcus, supranote 7, at 778 (weighing
author's interest against public interest and concluding that balance should be "in favor of
unrestricted expression").
185. Those who argue against sampling might point out that samplers' goal of public
availability, which implies that samplers should be allowed more liberal access to others' works,
ignores the fundamental distinction between re-creating the work and taking the actual sounds.
See Thom, supranote 15, at 319 (distinguishing between legal use of musical composition and
illegal use of actual sound recording). Using this argument, a law prohibiting sampling still
would promote the goal of public access by allowing artists to re-make previous works; it just
would not, and should not, allow use of actual sounds. The Ninth Circuit's harsh admonition
against the copying of another artist's actual sounds by music pirates who made copies of others'
work lends support to this argument. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972). The court stated that the infringer "may, of course,
record appellant's song, when she hires musicians, artists, and technicians. Instead, she steals
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access is important, Congress has also recognized that the interest of
the artist is important. 8 ' Promoting the interests of artists, for
example, will serve the public by creating incentives for artists to
create more works of art. 8 7 Allowing digital samplers to use artists'
works without permission, critics could argue, would contravene any
policy that Congress has ever championed. a
IV. THE CASE: GRAND UPRIGHT MuSiC LTD. V. WARNER BROS.
RECORDS, INC.

Before December 1991, the controversy surrounding the copyright
implications of digital sampling could only take the form of a debate
as to what the law should be with regards to sampling. With no
judicial decisions addressing the issue' 89 and with a controlling
statute that predated the development of sampling technology, the
debate was necessarily and uncomfortably theoretical. On December
16, 1991, however, the Southern District of New York, "[a]fter many
years of anticipation and speculation,""9 announced the first
judicial opinion to address the issues presented by digital sampling,
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.'

the genius and talent of others. She deceives others into thinking that her tapes represent her
own work." Id. at 1311; see also International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240
(1918) (denouncing appropriation of another's work for commercial purposes by stating that
only one who has paid fair price should be allowed to use commercial property).
186. See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) (providing that, along with
promotion of public good, purpose of copyright law is also to secure "to the composer an
adequate return for all use made of his composition").
187. See Hearings on Copyright supra note 182, at 65 (statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein,
Register of Copyrights, accompanied by Barbara Ringer, Assistant Register) ("[T]he most
important elements of any civilization include its independent creators-its authors, composers,
and artists--who create as a matter of personal initiative and spontaneous expression rather than
as a result of patronage or subsidy. A strong, practical copyright law is the only assurance we
have that this creative activity will continue.").
188. In fact, some in government have voiced objections to recorded cover versions of
musical compositions. See Vestron, Inc. v. ITC Prods., 597 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (App. Div. 1993)
(defining "cover versions" as songs written by one artist but performed by other artists). The
Register of Copyrights has stated:
The effect of this process on individual performers has been catastrophic, but the
effect of this process on the nature and variety of records that are made and kept in
release, and on the content and variety of radio programming, have been equally
malign. Most of all it is the United States public that has suffered from this process.
S. REP. No. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1975). If some critics have been vocal in their
opposition to covers of recorded songs, it is safe to say that many would also be vocal in their
opposition to digital sampling.
189. See supra note 26 (discussing reasons for absence of case law on subject of digital
sampling).
190. Sugarman & Salvo, supranote 31, at 1 (stating that no court addressed sampling prior
to Grand UprightMusic).
191. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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A. The FactualBackground
Grand Upright Music Ltd., the alleged copyright owner of pop artist
Gilbert O'Sullivan's 1972 hit "Alone Again (Naturally)," brought a
copyright infringement action to enjoin all production and sales of
rap artist Biz Markie's album "I Need a Haircut."9 2 Grand Upright
Music based its claim on the fact that Biz Markie's album contained
a song entitled "Alone Again" that used three words and a portion of
the music from the master recording of the Gilbert O'Sullivan
song.'
Before the infringement action arose, Biz Markie's attorney
had tried to get permission to use the 1972 song from Terry O'Sullivan, the artist's brother and agent, by sending a letter requesting use
19 4
of the song along with a cassette copy of Biz Markie's recording.
Before the two reached an agreement, however, Biz Markie released
the "I Need a Haircut" album. 5 Mr. O'Sullivan subsequently
refused to grant permission to use the song and, after repeated
96
demands to remove the album from the market, he filed suit.

B. The Opinion
The defendants in this case, Biz Markie and the record companies
that produced "I Need a Haircut,"9 7 conceded that the Biz Markie
song used words and music from the Gilbert O'Sullivan song.1'9 On
the basis of this admission, the district court concluded that Biz
Markie's use constituted infringement of the original song's copyright"m and that the only remaining issue was whether Grand
Upright Music was the true owner of the "Alone Again (Naturally)"
copyright."° The court ruled that Grand Upright Music was the
owner of the copyright based on three categories of proof: (1) copies

192. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
193. Id. The three words used from the Gilbert O'Sullivan song were the three words from
the title, and the music used was the first eight bars of "Alone Again (Naturally)." Sugarman
& Salvo, supra note 31, at 1, 5.
194. See Sugarman & Salvo, supranote 31, at 5 (citing Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction at 5, Grand
Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. 902112) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Motion]).
195. See Sugarman & Salvo, supranote 31, at 5 (citing Plaintiff's Motion at 6 and Defendant's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 10-11, Grand UprightMusic).
196. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 31, at 5.
197. GrandUprightMusic,780 F. Supp. at 182 (including among defendant record companies
Warner Bros. Records, Inc., WEA International, Inc., Biz Markie Productions, Inc., Cool V
Productions, Inc., and Cold Chillin' Records, Inc.).
198. Id. at 183.
199. Id. at 184.
200. Id. at 183.
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of the copyrights and deeds vesting title to the copyrights in Gilbert
O'Sullivan and then from O'Sullivan to Grand Upright Music; 21 (2)
testimony of Gilbert O'Sullivan acknowledging Grand Upright Music
as the copyright owner; 2 2 and (3) the defendants' attempt to
contact Gilbert and Terry O'Sullivan. °3 With regard to the third
element of proof of ownership, the court held that the defendants'
attempt to discuss terms for use of the song with Terry and Gilbert
O'Sullivan was evidence that the plaintiff owned a valid copyright.2'
The court reasoned that the defendants would not have attempted to
discuss terms with O'Sullivan if the latter were not the copyright
owner.

20 5

The court further concluded that Biz Markie's use of the song
violated Grand Upright Music's valid copyright to the song. 6 As
a result, the court enjoined the sale of Biz Markie's album.0 7 The
court also found that the defendants intended "to sell thousands
upon thousands of records" by knowingly violating the copyright. 20 8
Consequently, the court referred the case to the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York for possible criminal prosecution of the
2°
defendants for willful copyright infringement.

201. Id. The court relied in part on a deed vesting original title to the copyrights in Gilbert
O'Sullivan and another transferring the copyrights from O'Sullivan to Grand Upright Music in
deciding that Grand Upright Music had actual ownership of the copyrights. Id. The defendants
objected to the admission of the transferring documents on the grounds that the documents
had not been filed with the Registrar of Copyrights and thus had no legal effect. Id. at 184.
The court rejected this argument, holding that the law does not negate the effect of transferring
documents simply because they were not filed with the Registrar of Copyrights. Id.
202. Id. The court concluded that O'Sullivan was a "credible" and "believable" witness and
that "[t]here can be no one more interested in the question of valid copyright than a person
in Gilbert O'Sullivan's position." Id.
203. See id. at 183-84 (stating that counsel for Biz Markie wrote to Terry O'Sullivan, Gilbert
O'Sullivan's agent, and enclosed copy of Biz Markie song that incorporated Gilbert O'Sullivan's
"Alone Again (Naturally)" and sought "terms" for use of song).
204. Id. at 184. The letter sent by the defendants' attorney said:
This firm represents a recording artist professionally known as Biz Markie, who has
recorded a composition for Cold Chillin' Records entitled "Alone Again" which
incorporates portions of the composition entitled "Alone Again Naturally" [sic]
originally recorded by Gilbert O'Sullivan (the "Original Composition"). Biz Markie
would like to obtain your consent to the use of the "Original Composition."
Id.
205. See id. (explaining that "[o]ne would not agree to pay to use the material of another
unless there was a valid copyrightl").
206. Id. at 185.
207. Id. The case was settled out of court a few days after the court's decision. See Philips,
supra note 151, at Fl. The exact amount of the settlement was undisclosed; Biz Markie and
Warner Bros. Records reportedly agreed to pay a "substantial" amount of money. Id.
208. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 184-85 (listing evidence obtained from defendants'
testimony showing that defendants knew that license was necessary).
209. See id. at 185 (holding that defendant may have violated 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) and 18
U.S.C. § 2319); see also supranote 123 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of criminal
penalties for willful infringement under § 506(a) of Copyright Act). Criminal penalties for
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THE EFFECT OF GRAND UPRIGHT Music ON THE LAW REGARDING
DIGITAL SAMPLING

A. The Decision'sEffect on the Law RegardingDigitalSampling
There are two reasons to believe that Grand Upright Music will have
First, the Southern
a strong impact on digital sampling law. 1
District of New York, which decided Grand Upright Music, handles a
substantial percentage of all the copyright and entertainment law
cases in this country.2 1' The Grand Upright Music decision, which is
binding authority on all cases that come out of the Southern District
of New York, will thus serve as controlling authority on a large
percentage of future digital sampling cases.
Second, because GrandUprightMusic is the onlyjudicial pronouncement on the issue of digital sampling, it is likely to be persuasive
authority in other jurisdictions. Considering the vagueness of the
outdated body of statutory law,1 2 and the lack of judicial assistance
in applying the statutory law to digital sampling,21 3 future digital

copyright infringement can result in a fine of up to $250,000 or imprisonment for up to five
years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (1988).
210. It is not appropriate to analyze the Grand UprightMusic decision to determine its likely
effect on digital sampling law without first discussing the decision's potential influence from a
jurisdictional standpoint. If, as a matter of civil procedure, a decision has no binding authority
on other jurisdictions, then an analysis of the case's merits is moot. A case from one federal
district court is not binding on another district court and is only considered to be persuasive
authority. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1878) (providing that U.S. courts "are
tribunals of a different sovereignty, exercising a distinct and independent jurisdiction");
Huffman v. Inland Oil &Transp., 424 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ill. App. 1981) (stating that each state
determines reach of its laws). Grand Upright Music, a district court case, is thus suspect in the
sense that other district courts will not have a responsibility even to consider it. Huffian, 424
N.E.2d at 1212.
The influence of Grand Upright Music on state courts is not an issue because state courts do
not handle questions of copyright law;, the Copyright Act preempts all other state copyright laws
and makes copyright an exclusively federal question. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a) (1988). Section 301 (a)
states:
On and afterJanuary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether
created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Id.
211. SeeHarriete K. Dorsen, SatiricApp opriationand the Law ofLibe, Trademark, and Copyright:
Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L REV. 923, 955 (1985) (stating that New York generates large
portion of copyright litigation).
212. See Copyright Act of 1976, §§ 101-116, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988) (failing to mention
digital sampling due to fact that digital sampling did not exist at time).
213. See supranotes 179-80 and accompanying text (explaining lack of statutory andjudicial
interpretation for digital sampling due to recent introduction of digital sampling in
marketplace).
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sampling cases from other jurisdictions will at least address the Grand
Upright Music decision. Other jurisdictions, therefore, may use this
case as a starting point from which to rule on digital sampling simply
because it is the first and only court ruling on digital sampling. For
purposes of a detailed legal review of this decision, then, this Note
assumes that the Grand UprightMusic decision will influence the law.
How the Decision Will Influence the Law RegardingDigitalSampling
214
Although long awaited as the first digital sampling decision,
Grand UprightMusic left many questions unanswered. One prominent
entertainment lawyer said, "' [T]his isn't the seminal case everyone
While the court ruled that Biz Markie's sampling
wanted.' '2 1
violated the copyright law, the court failed to mention the elements
necessary to prove copyright infringement, with the exception of the
copyright ownership element.216 Although the decision failed to
clear up many of the theoretical legal questions regarding digital
sampling, it still will have a significant impact on the music and
entertainment industry.
B.

1.

The impact on the questions of law presented by digital sampling

The Grand Upright Music decision explicitly focuses on ownership, 217 one of the elements a plaintiff must demonstrate to prove
infringement. 18 This issue, however, is not the real problem that
digital sampling brings to copyright law. Observers had hoped that
this case would address some of the questions that the issue of fair
use 219 presents to digital sampling, such as sampling's effect on the
market 22' and the role of substantial similarity in a digital sampling

214. Sugarman & Salvo, supranote 31, at 1 (maintaining that Grand UprightMusic will "open
a new chapter in the continuing saga of sampling litigation").
215. See Stan Soocher, As SamplingSuits Proliferate,Legal GuidelinesAre Emerging,207 N.Y. LJ.
5, 5 (1992) (Entertainment Update) (quoting Stewart Levy, attorney for dance music producer
Jellybean Benitez).
216. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that only issue in case was ownership of copyright).
217. Id. at 182-83.
218. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (stating that owner of sound recording
must demonstrate ownership in copyright suit). A plaintiff must show ownership to get standing
to bring a suit of copyright infringement. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text
(discussing various copyright ownership arrangements). Because ownership is a question
involving the plaintiff's title to the copyright, the issue of Grand Upright Music's ownership has
nothing to do with Biz Markie's sampling; rather, the issue affected questions of proof regarding
Grand Upright Music's standing to sue. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 182-85.
219. The common thread running through the entire controversy surrounding digital
sampling is the question of fair use.
220. See supranotes 167-78 and accompanying text (addressing debate over digital sampling's
effect on original song's market for sales).
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suit.2
Yet, without addressing any defense of fair use issues, the
court ruled that, once the plaintiff proved ownership, infringement
had occurred by the simple fact that Biz Markie had sampled Gilbert
O'Sullivan's song. 2
The court's failure to discuss fair use can be interpreted in two
ways. On one hand, the omission could be an intentional admonishment against the use of the fair use defense in a digital sampling case.
By failing even to address the possibility that Biz Markie's use was a
fair use, the court could be suggesting that the fair use defense has
no place in digital sampling. If this interpretation of the court's
omission is correct, then digital sampling of a song is per se infringement if the sampler fails to secure the copyright owner's permission.
This approach thus would make unauthorized digital sampling a strict
liability offense; questions of adverse market effects or insubstantiality
become irrelevant. Mr. O'Sullivan's attorney, Jody Pope, adopts this
view of the Grand Upright Music decision, explaining that "if a
reasonable listener can recognize a sample as the work of someone
else, it's enough for an infringement."223
On the other hand, the court's omission of fair use in its decision
may derive from the fact that Biz Markie's acts so clearly amounted
to an infringement that fair use was not an issue in this particular
case. The court may have reasoned that Biz Markie used such a
substantially similar portion of Gilbert O'Sullivan's song that the fair
use defense was not available to him. 24 If this interpretation
explains the court's decision, then a fair use defense would still be
possible in a digital sampling case that involves a more limited use of
a protected song. Under this approach, unauthorized digital
sampling would not constitute infringement per se. Rather, sampling
would be allowed in certain limited situations where the defendant
can show that the sampling of another's work constitutes fair use.

221. See supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text (presenting controversy over issue of
substantial similarity in cases of digital sampling).
222. Grand UprightMusic 780 F. Supp. at 183.
223. See Soocher, supranote 215, at 5 (presenting various views of legal experts as to impact
of Grand Upright Music).
224. Biz Markie took only three words from "Alone Again (Naturally)." See Sugarman &
Salvo, supranote 31, at 5. However, the three words Biz Markie took are the lyrical refrain and
the only words in the title of the original song. Id. The significance of the portion used clearly
precludes a finding of fair use. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (noting that small part
of work may be considered substantial if it is important and material part of work). Biz Markie
also took and repeatedly used eight bars, a substantial length of music, from the Gilbert
O'Sullivan song. See Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 31, at 1, 5 (reporting that sample from
"Alone Again (Naturally)" was "looped" in order to create musical underscore for Markie's rap
single). Thus, Biz Markie's use of the O'Sullivan song clearly did not warrant a fair use defense.
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Grand UprightMusic also fails to clarify the issue of willful infringement. In Grand UprightMusic, the district court referred the case to
the U.S. Attorney for possible criminal sanctions because it had found
willful infringement. 21 In particular, the defendants' actions and
testimony indicated that they knew Mr. O'Sullivan owned a valid
copyright.226 The court, however, omitted any discussion of whether
willfulness requires a specific intent to break the law or only a broader
227
intent to commit an act that is an infringement of a copyright.
The fact that the defendants knew that they were sampling a
copyrighted song without authorization was sufficient for the court to
find the defendants guilty of copyright infringement. 228 Nevertheless, the court's utter failure to explain what level of intent is needed
for sampling to constitute infringement perpetuates the confusion
surrounding willful infringement.
The Grand Upright Music decision not only fails to clarify the
unresolved copyright law questions presented by digital sampling, it
also fails to support its sweeping conclusions with sound legal
reasoning. For example, the opinion begins with the Commandment
"Thou shalt not steal."229 Yet, the core question presented by
sampling is whether sampling actually is theft. This question cannot
be answered adequately without consideration of the legal and
theoretical underpinnings of sampling. The court based its decision
solely on an analysis of the ownership question; to equate the practice
of unauthorized sampling with stealing is to make a judgment based
on an incomplete analysis.
Similarly, the judge opined that the defendants' "only aim was to
sell thousands upon thousands of records" 230 and spoke of the
defendants' "callous disregard for the law."2 ' The fact that the
defendants used the work for the purpose of selling records, however,
does not resolve the fair use question. A court must consider three
other factors in its fair use determination. 2 The fact that the
defendants in this case aimed to sell records thus is not conclusive by

225. Grand Upright Music 780 F. Supp. at 185 (stating that defendants knew that they were
violating plaintiff's rights).
226. Id. at 184-85 (referring to letter requesting consent to use "Original Composition" and
admissions by defendants that they knew license from copyright holder was necessary).
227. Cf supranote 124 (showing that courts differ on issue of whether willfulness requires
specific or general intent).
228. Grand Upright Musi, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
229. Id. at 183 (quoting Exodus 20:15).
230. Id. at 185.
231. Id.
232. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (stating that purpose of use is one of four
factors in fair use inquiry).
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itself.
Grand Upright Music thus suffers from inadequate legal reasoning.
If the court had detailed how it reached its decision, the opinion
would have provided some solutions to the legal mysteries surrounding digital sampling. Unfortunately, the court passed by this
opportunity, perhaps indicating that even the courts are not clear on
how the law applies to digital sampling.
2.

The impact on the music industry

Even though the court in Grand UprightMusic did not expressly rule
out the possibility that the limited use of a song may be legal, the
court's strong condemnation of unauthorized sampling 33 could be
construed as a declaration that sampling constitutes infringement per
se. Thus, while Grand Upright Music provides little guidance on the
legal questions of digital sampling, it will still have a major impact on
the music industry because it is a strong judicial denunciation of the
practice of unauthorized sampling." For this reason, samplers will
have to alter their behavior.
After Grand Upright Music, sampling without consent of the
copyright owner entails great risk. 35 An artist who creates an
unauthorized sampling, for example, faces potential criminal
Consequently, the decision will encourage samplers
prosecution.2
to obtain consent from copyright owners before sampling songs.2 37

233. See Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185 (declaring that defendants' behavior
constituted "callous disregard" for law and rights of others).
234. See Philips, supra note 151, at F12 ("'This represents the first judicial pronouncement
that this practice is indeed theft.'") (quotingJody Pope, Mr. O'Sullivan's attorney). The court's
invocation of the Seventh Commandment also shows that the court is denouncing unauthorized
digital sampling as nothing less than theft. See Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 183
(beginning decision with declaration, "Thou shalt not steal").
235. See Richard Harrington, The Groove Robbers'Judgment: Order on 'Sampling'Songs May Be
Rap Landmark, WASH. PoST, Dec. 25, 1991, at Dl, D7 ("Sometimes rappers have gambled that
a sample would not be recognized, or that no suits would be filed (and generally they
aren't-unless an album or single is successful). Last week's ruling is likely to blunt any 'wait
and see' attitudes.").
236. See Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185 (referring case to U.S. Attorney for
consideration of criminal charges); see also Rule, supranote 7, at C18 (quoting Ms. Hope Carr
of sample clearinghouse Clearance 13'-8" as saying that GrandUprightMusic has "'made everyone
up-tight"). A record company executive who had been working with a band that used samples
said, "'Because of the Biz Markie ruling, we had to make sure we had written clearance on
everything beforehand.'" Id.
237. See Rule, supra note 7, at C18 (quoting Mr. O'Sullivan's attorney, Jody Pope, as saying,
"'The effect will be that people will be careful to obtain consent and clearance before they make
use of someone eise's property-and isn't that the way it should be?'"). Monica Lynch,
president of Tommy Boy Records, also believes that GrandUprightMusic will encourage samplers
to first obtain clearance from copyright owners. Id. She said that the decision "'will send a
[1It
very direct message to artists themselves that they have a responsibility to clear samples ....
will make labels, artists and producers a lot more cautious about making sure their t's are
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Ironically, the Grand Upright Music decision might also discourage
samplers from obtaining clearance before sampling. The court based
its decision to send the case to the U.S. Attorney for consideration of
possible criminal sanctions on the defendants' attempt to obtain
2
consent from O'Sullivan before releasing "I Need a Haircut." 1
This reasoning may actually discourage samplers from trying to obtain
consent from copyright owners because such an attempt might later
29
be used against them as evidence of willful infringement.
Grand Upright Music therefore imposes a "catch-22." To escape
liability, samplers are told to obtain clearance. Yet the very attempt
to obtain clearance may increase the possibility of criminal prosecution for willful infringement. This absurd result may force artists to
abandon sampling altogether and to explore possible alternatives.2 °
One might argue that this decision finally, and rightly, will prohibit
samplers from depriving both song owners the compensation that
they deserve 24 1 and musicians the employment that they would
normally receive were it not for sampling.2' At the same time, if
artists cannot obtain permission from a song's owner to use a
previously recorded song, they may have to return to using musicians.
Hiring extra musicians or compensating a song's owner for the use of
even a small portion of a protected song may then increase the costs
of recording.24 3 In the final analysis, Grand Upright Music will do
more than simply curb the use of a technique; it could injure rap and
hip-hop music to the point of destroying an art form.2 4

crossed and their i's dotted before they put music out in the marketplace.'" Id.
238. See Grand UprightMusic, 780 F. Supp. at 184-85 (discussing how defendants' letter to
O'Sullivan's brother/agent requesting permission to use song indicated knowledge and calling
for "sterner measures" for such "callous disregard" for law and rights of others).
239. See Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 31, at 6 (noting that licensors typically require
submission of piece featuring sampling before issuing license although this process requires
samplers to violate copyright law by creating piece).
240. Some prominent rap artists that are well known for their sampling have refrained from
using sampling since the Grand UprightMusic decision. For example, L.L. Cool J toured the
United States with a live band and Hammer's last album contained no samples. Rule, supra note
7, at C18.
241. SeeSteve HochmanJudge Raps Practiceof'Sampling"LA. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at Fl, F2
(quoting Michael Greene, President of National Academy of Recording Arts & Sciences, as
saying that -[the] academy tends to fall on the side of the [songwriters] feeling they are due
some consideration for their work'").
242. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing how musicians are hurt
economically by sampling).
243. See Harrington, supra note 235, at D7 (noting that rappers have complained that
original artists often ask extraordinary prices, ranging from $500 to $50,000, for permission to
sample their songs).
244. See Philips, supra note 151, at F12 (quoting Dan Charnas, director of hip-hop A & R
(Artists and Repertory) and promotions director at Def American Records, who believes that
Grand Upright Music will destroy hip-hop music and culture).
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A.

SOLUTIONS

Congress Should Amend the Copyright Act

Grand Upright Musi's shortcomings suggest that the Copyright Act
is so outdated that it simply cannot provide answers to the digital
sampling problem. A revision of the Act may thus be the only
solution to the sampling dilemma.
Throughout this country's history, Congress has periodically
updated copyright law."4 Prior to 1976, Congress had not made
major revisions to copyright law since 1909.21 Congress recognized
in 1976 that extraordinary technological advances had taken place
since 1909 and understood that it needed to revise the Copyright Act
to meet those changes. 47
A revision of the current copyright law to accommodate sampling
would be consistent with both the Copyright Act's history of periodic
adjustment due to technological advancements2' and the purposes
of copyright law. The Copyright Act has two major objectives:
securing an adequate return for the artist, and securing public access
to artistic works through the prevention of monopolies. 2 49 When
copyright laws become outdated, new technologies escape regulation
and the Act's policy goals are thwarted. The history of the 1909
revisions is an excellent illustration.
In 1909, Congress revised the Copyright Act in response to recent
technological advances in the mechanical reproduction of music,
notably, the advent of player pianos that used paper music rolls. °0

245. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5660 (commenting that comprehensive revisions to 1790 copyright act occurred in 1831,
1870, and 1909).
246. See id. (noting that several revisionary efforts between 1924 and 1940 failed).
247. See id. (citing advances in communication of printed matter, information storage,
communications satellites, and laser technology as prompting change).
248. See BOORSTYN, supra note 53, at 1-2 n.2 (stating that Congress extended protection to
prints, musical compositions, photographs, art, motion pictures, and sound recording at
different intervals).
249. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (discussing two primary policies behind
copyright law).
250.

See RUSSELL SANJEK & DAVID SANjEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MusIc BusiNEss IN THE 20TH

CENTURY 12 (1991) (discussing transformation of rights and privileges of American composers,
songwriters, authors, and publishers, and noting Copyright Act of 1909 as principal catalyst for
change). Piano mechanic John McTammany patented the player piano in 1850 but did not
have the means to market it. Id. at ix. It was not until 1899 that William B. Tremaine, who
purchased the patent rights from McTammany, introduced a marketable self-playing piano. Id.
Soon after, Tremaine sold 75,000 player pianos and a million music rolls. Id.
The other technological innovation in the mechanical reproduction of music that helped
spawn the 1909 Act was the phonograph. Id. at 12. In 1896, Eldridge Reeve Johnson, in
conjunction with Emile Berliner, invented the Victrola, a motor-powered phonograph that
improved the sound of earlier hand-cranked machines. Id. at viii. Between 1901 and 1909,
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The Aeolian Company signed exclusive agreements with eighty-seven
music publishers to produce piano rolls in return for a ten percent
royalty on the retail price." 1 Soon after President Theodore
Roosevelt learned of this unregulated monopoly in 1907, Congress2
saw the need to revise the law to address the new technology.'
The 1909 Act eventually mandated a two cent royalty for each piano
roll manufactured. z 3
Like the production of piano rolls, the advent of digital sampling
is a change in technology that requires congressional response.
The Copyright Act of 1976 never considered the technology of
sampling; 5 the Act thus provides courts with little guidance on
sampling. 6 The decision in Grand Upright Music reflects this lack
of legislative guidance and highlights the outdated nature of the Act.
A legislative change in the existing law would reduce lawsuits by
eliminating this uncertainty and would put to rest the debate over the
legality of sampling.

production of recorded products increased from 3,750,000 to 27,500,000. Id.
251. See id. at 12 (explaining thatjames F. Bowers, president of Music Publishers Association,
had been instrumental in convincing 87 Association members to grant exclusive piano-roll
recording rights to Aeolian).
252. See id. (stating that certain new provision of Copyright Act of 1909 originated from
attention President Roosevelt and industry competitors dedicated to it). President Roosevelt
actually appealed to Congress to change the Act prior to 1907. In a 1905 address to Congress,
he said:
Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect in definition, confused
and inconsistent in expression; they omit provision for many articles which, under
modem reproductive processes, are entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon
the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the fair protection of the public;
they are difficult for the courts to interpret. ... A complete revision of them is
essential.
ALAN LATMAN ET AL., COPYMGHT FOR THE EIGHTIs 7 (2d ed. 1985).
253. Copyright Act, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909).
254. In 1976, Congress amended the Copyright Act in response to technological advances
in such fields as printed-matter publication, information storage, communications satellites, and
laser technology. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprnted in 1976
U.S.C.CAN. 5659, 5660. Digital sampling technology is as important a breakthrough as these
other technologies. Sampling has revolutionized the music industry in that many big-name
artists use sampling technology. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing increase of
sampling due to advent of rap genre). Furthermore, it has greatly enhanced the average
person's ability to experiment with music. See supranotes 47-48 and accompanying text (noting
that decrease in price of sampling equipment has increased artists' access to sampling).
255. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text (discussing how Copyright Act is
unequipped to deal effectively with current digital sampling technology because digital sampling
was not in existence at time of 1976 revision).
256. But see H.L REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CA.N. 5659, 5680 (stating that courts must decide whether to invoke fair use doctrine on
case-by-case basis).
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Congress Should Institute a Compulsory Licensing Provisionfor Digital
Sampling

Copyright law's two competing policy goals, public access to works
of art and protection of copyright owners' rights to profit, 7 are
diametrically opposed objectives." s For example, a prohibition on
sampling would disregard the policy of access to others' works. At the
same time, allowing unrestricted unauthorized sampling would
compromise the copyright owners' interests in seeking an adequate
return on their works. To achieve the optimal balance between these
two goals, the law should take the middle ground.
A modified compulsory licensing system for digital sampling is one
solution that has the potential to satisfy both policy interests. The
current compulsory licensing provision under § 115 of the Act strikes
a balance between the two competing copyright goals.2 9 Section
115 compels a copyright owner to grant another artist a license to
"cover" her song,2 ° an approach that furthers the goal of public
access by allowing anyone to obtain access to a song. Section 115 also
mandates that the person using the protected song pay compensation
to the copyright owner,26 1 thus furthering the goal of protecting
owners.
Presently, the Act grants a compulsory license only for covers, which
are re-creations of songs by different musicians. 262 Congress should
extend the Act's coverage to sampling and to the use of the actual
sounds. Both sampling and the covering of songs are forms of art
that take previous works and put them in new contexts;263 one uses
the musical composition, while the other appropriates the sound
recording. The principle is the same, however, in that they both use
past works.2" Thus, compulsory license provisions should govern

257. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (presenting congressional, judicial, and
scholarly opinions regarding policies behind copyright laws).
258. See supra notes 182-88 and accompanying text (revealing that samplers support access
and sampling critics support protection).
259. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988) (guaranteeing public access to works through compulsory
licensing, while insuring copyright owner royalty payments).
260. See id. § 115 (a) (requiring licensee to serve notice of compulsory license on copyright
owner in order to receive such license).
261. See id- § 115(c) (stating that owner is "entitled to royalties" to be determined either by
number of works used or minutes of playing time).
262. Id. § 115(a).
263. See supra note 154 (presenting support for argument that digital sampling puts older
works into new context just like other forms of art).
264. Originally, the purpose of distinguishing actual sounds from the musical composition
and of forbidding the re-recording of actual sounds was to prevent tape "piracy," which is the
unauthorized re-recording of an original work. See United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010,
1014 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that § 1 (f) of 1971 Sound Recording Act, precursor to §§ 114
and 115 of 1976 Copyright Act, forbids re-recording of actual sounds yet grants compulsory
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both covering and sampling.21 Such a provision would further the

license for musical compositions), affid in part and vacate in part, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977). The court in Taxe held, however, that the purpose was not
to prevent "trivial re-recording[s]" or re-recordings that have been substantially changed so that
the original is unrecognizable. Taxe 380 F. Supp. at 1014. Songs that use digitally sampled
material fall within these two categories that Congress, at least according to Taxe did not intend
to prevent when it drafted the distinction between actual sounds and musical compositions.
Samplers' music, which usually appropriates very small portions of other songs, thus might
qualify as "trivial re-recordings." See Soocher, supra note 215, at 26 (quoting Ken Anderson,
counsel for Beastie Boys, as saying "We're dealing in a world of minutia with sampling because
most samples are very small portions of pre-existing recordings."). Furthermore, samplers often
change the sounds that they borrow so that they are not easily recognizable. See Goldberg &
Bernstein, supra note 36, at 2 (claiming alteration of sounds is limited only by imagination);
Houle, supra note 32, at 881 (stating that individual can "vary, delete or reverse certain tonal
qualities"); McGiverin, supra note 32, at 1725 (discussing alteration ofsample by replacing codes,
moving placement of sounds, adding or deleting entire arrangements, and muting or
augmenting individual instruments). The whole purpose of providing a compulsory license for
the musical composition but not for the sound recording was to prevent piracy, not digital
sampling.
265. Some artists have even argued that having a compulsory licensing provision for musical
compositions, while not having one for sound recordings, is a violation of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Shaab v. Kleindienst, 345 F. Supp. 589 (D.D.C. 1972), the
plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the Attorney General from prosecuting him under the criminal
provisions of the Copyright Act. Id. at 590. The plaintiff claimed that failure to provide for a
compulsory license for sound recordings "gives rise to an invidious discrimination against one
who like himself is subject to compulsory licensing of his musical compositions." Id. The district
court rejected this argument, ruling that distinguishing between musical compositions and sound
recordings, in terms of compulsory licenses, is both "rational and reasonable." Id. The court
explained that the compulsory license provision for musical compositions promotes the arts by
allowing for different interpretations of a written composition. Id. A compulsory license
provision for sound recordings, however, would not yield the same public benefits because
"[c] onsumer choices would not be broadened since identical interpretations would be supplied
first by the originator and later by the licensee." Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W.D. Okla. 1974), defendants indicted
for selling copies of sound recordings made the same argument asserted by the plaintiff in
Shaab: "The lack of adequate provisions for compulsory licensing... for sound recordings while
providing the same ... for musical compositions is a direct denial of due process which
discriminates between the rights of a recording company and of legitimate sound recording
distributors." Id. at 1268. The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma rejected the
defendants' Fourteenth Amendment argument, relying almost exclusively on Shaab. Id. at 126869 (quoting Shaab).
In Shaab and in Bodin, the courts rejected the due process argument because society would
not receive the same public benefits under a compulsory license provision for sound recordings
as it does under a compulsory license provision for musical compositions, namely the potential
for different artistic interpretations of a single musical work. See Bodin, 375 F. Supp. at 1268

(finding court's reasoning in Shaab persuasive and quoting that language at length); Shaab, 345

F. Supp. at 590 (stating that instead of different artistic interpretations, compulsory licensing of
sound recordings would not broaden consumer choices and, in fact, would impair competition

and creativity of industry). These arguments do not hold true anymore in light of the fact that
digital sampling became available in 1983, years after these early 1970s cases. See Sanjek, supra
note 22, at 612 (explaining that first MIDI synthesizer, which facilitated modern sampling,

appeared on market in 1983). Digital sampling allows for different reanimations of old songs,
not just duplicative recordings. See McGiverin, supra note 32, at 1725 (discussing how digital
sampling can correct pitch, move sounds, add or delete whole sections, and mute or augment
single instruments). A compulsory licensing provision for sound recordings would thus permit

more than one artistic interpretation of a composition.

For this reason, the Shaab court's

rationale for rejecting the constitutional argument is outdated. Thus, a due process claim may

now be valid.
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Act's two policy goals. A compulsory license provision for sampling
would help samplers by guaranteeing them access to songs. At the
same time, it would protect song owners by assuring them compensation for use of their songs.
This proposal would also make unauthorized sampling illegal and
unnecessary because samplers would enjoy guaranteed use of a
song."6
Moreover, the law should not penalize samplers for
attempting to obtain a license from a song owner. If approaching a
song owner to obtain a license is not used as evidence of infringement against the defendant in a copyright suit, samplers will be
encouraged to try to obtain consent first.
CONCLUSION

In modem musical culture, digital sampling has emerged as a
popular technique for exploring and reexamining older music.
Because the sampling phenomenon is more far-reaching in its
technological capabilities than any previous musical technology,
sampling has transcended the scope of the existing law, forcing
lawyers, musicians, and others in the music entertainment business to
analyze this new musical technique in a legal vacuum, and leaving
them only to speculate as to how the old law applies to sampling. As
a result, much debate and controversy among those interested in the
entertainment law field have produced a whole spectrum of opinions
on digital sampling's place in the law. In fact, even the judiciary
appears confused and undecided on how the law should treat
sampling, as evidenced by the Grand Upright Music decision.
The law, however, cannot ignore the new technology of digital
sampling or dismiss it as a fad devoid of artistic value. Digital
sampling is a form of art that the law must not forbid. At the same
time, the law must regulate samplers to protect song owners from
unauthorized copyright use. Congress needs to change the Copyright
Act to accommodate sampling, just as it has done in the past to
accommodate other new technologies. A compulsory licensing
provision that guarantees compensation is an ideal solution for
amending the Act in that it satisfies the interests of both the public
266. Some samplers may argue that this proposal would increase their expenses by forcing
them to pay for the use of samples. See Harrington, supra note 235, at D7 (noting rappers'
argument that artists often charge extraordinary prices to sample their songs). Use of another's
song, however, warrants compensation. It would be unfair to guarantee access to samplers and
not guarantee compensation to song owners. Perhaps one solution to the problem of
extraordinarily high prices would be to implement a pay scale for the use of a song based on
the size of the portion taken from the song. This approach would guarantee compensation to
the owner in proportion to the amount of the song used.
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and the artist and creates a framework that can accommodate future
technologies still unforeseen.

